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This paper provides a very tentative review of the monetary and prudential policy responses to the
post-bubble adjustments in Japan. The adjustments after the collapse of the bubble have been pro-
longed due to (1) the rapid downward revision of the expected economic growth rate; (2) balance-
sheet adjustments on the part of firms; and (3) the malfunctioning of the financial intermediary 
system stemming from its nonperforming-asset problem. We use four yardsticks, Marshallian k,
Taylor rule, the equity yield spread, and the short-term real interest rate for assessing the monetary
easing. The results suggest that the timing of policy reversal was swift and the magnitude of easing 
in the early phase could be viewed as broadly adequate for dealing with a normal business cycle. 
It is possible to argue that the effects of the bursting of the bubble might have not been sufficiently
taken into account. It should be noted the outcome would not have differed greatly even if the 
drastic monetary easing that eventually took place had been decided at an earlier point in time 
without a fundamental cure of the nonperforming-asset problem. A considerable achievement of 
prudential policy in the period under review is that systemic risk was avoided with the cost being
delayed in establishing a legal framework for handling troubled financial institutions and in 
organizing a comprehensive safety net. As a result of this delay, it took a long time to deal with the
nonperforming-asset problem. This, in turn, posed a serious drag on the economy. Our preliminary
conclusion about the lesson we should draw from this experience is the importance for the Bank of
Japan of identifying the precise impacts of shocks on the economy as well as their transmission 
mechanism promptly and thereby minimizing adjustment costs. It should also be conducive for the
Bank to address actively structural issues that may influence the effectiveness of its policy measures.
Key  words:  Monetary policy; Prudential policy; Bursting of bubble; Nonperforming assets;
Credit channel; Management of failure in financial institutions; Structural problemsI. Introduction
Some call the 1990s in Japan a “lost decade.” Whether it was lost or not, Japan expe-
rienced severe recession as evidenced by average real annual GDP growth declining
from 3.8 percent in the 1980s to 1.6 percent in the 1990s, and only 1 percent in the
eight years 1992-99. Average growth of 1 percent is substantially lower than that of 
3 percent for the same period in the United States (Figure 1). In fact, among G-7
countries, Japan’s real GDP growth in the 1990s was next to lowest; compared with
the 1980s, it marked the largest decline (Table 1).
As of end-1999, while the economy had shown signs of improvement, clear signs 
of the self-sustained recovery of private demand had yet to be seen. It was the first 
experience in the post-World War II period that slackness has lasted for some 10 years. 
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Table 1  Average Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP by Decade
Percent
1970s 1980s 1990s
Japan 5.2 3.8 1.6
United States 3.2 2.7 2.6
Germany 3.2 1.8 1.6
France 3.7 2.3 1.7
United Kingdom 2.4 2.4 1.8
Italy 3.7 2.4 1.3
Canada 4.4 2.9 2.0
Notes: 1. When calculating the average annual growth rates of the 1990s, data for 1999 are estimated
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, except for Japan, where
the data are based on the quick estimates published by the Economic Planning Agency.
2. Real GDP of Germany is that of West Germany until 1991 and that of unified Germany from
1992 onward, i.e., comparison is made with aggregate East and West German GDP in 1991.
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Main Economic Indicators, Economic Outlook.












Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts; 
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main 
               Economic Indicators, Economic Outlook.During the 1990s, various monetary and fiscal policy measures were effected to
avoid deflation: the Bank of Japan (BOJ) successively cut short-term interest rates to
virtually zero percent (Figure 2); and, as a result of the successive implementation of
fiscal stimulus measures, the fiscal deficit became the largest among major industrial
countries (Figure 3). The mere fact that Japan’s economy has been stagnant for 10
years despite these sizable monetary and fiscal stimuli seems to indicate that the
slackness cannot be explained solely by the normal business cycle, but that some
other deflationary factors also existed.
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Figure 2  Interest Rates
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Figure 3  Fiscal Deficits (Ratio to Nominal GDP) of the Major Industrial CountriesThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the factors that contributed to this 
prolonged stagnation, and to attempt a very tentative evaluation of monetary and
prudential policy responses in the post-bubble period.
1 The period subject to our
analysis is mainly from February 1991, the peak of the Heisei boom, to end-1999.
2
It is legitimate, at least to some extent, to say that prolonged stagnancy was
mainly due to the failure of not only firms and households but also the government
and the entire social and economic framework adapting adequately to the large wave
of changes, such as innovation in information and telecommunication technology
and changes in global competition.
3 With respect to the troubles facing financial
institutions, many have pointed out, rightly, that they were the result of banks’ over-
reliance on traditional banking business, the materialization of which had merely
been temporarily postponed because of the emergence and expansion of the bubble
economy. However, for arguing what were the most dominant factors behind the
problems, we have to wait at least for some more years before the Japanese economy
completes the post-bubble adjustments. It is certainly still premature to come to any
definitive conclusion.
Notwithstanding what the essential factors were, it is hard to deny that the 
emergence and burst of the bubble played an important role in the economic 
fluctuation of this decade. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the policy responses
to the shocks incurred by the burst of the bubble on real economic activity.
In doing so, however, we emphasize the following two points: (1) that policy deci-
sions were inevitably based on a information set available at that time; and (2) that
any policy assessment has to examine achievements as well as accompanying costs.
II. Japan’s Economic Development in the 1990s
This section provides a brief review of the prolonged economic stagnation which
took place in Japan in the 1990s. The main features of the decade were (1) a sub-
stantial decline in asset prices; (2) prolonged low growth in real GDP; (3) low growth
in monetary aggregates—the first negative year-on-year growth since the statistics
began to be compiled—and (4) a deterioration in the quality of firms’ assets and the
accumulation of nonperforming loans in the banking sector.
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1. With respect to the bank regulatory responses to the bursting of the asset price bubble since 1991, Cargill, Hutchison,
and Ito (1997) wrote that “the Ministry of Finance first adopted a ‘forbearance policy,’ allowing banks to hold non-
performing loans without special write-offs in the hope that the economy and the real-estate market would recover
quickly.” In fact, many regard prudential policy of this period as forbearance. Although we cannot deny that, shortly
after the bursting of the bubble, the authorities might have tried to buy time predicated on a rapid recovery of the
economy, it would not be appropriate to assess policy responses to financial system problems during the whole 1990s
solely as forbearance. In the absence of an adequate safety net, it might have been necessary for the authorities to buy
some time (e.g., the disposal of nonperforming assets within a financial institution’s income stream for a certain
period) in trying to improve the safety net and dispose of nonperforming assets simultaneously. 
2. According to the Economic Planning Agency, the economic expansion that started from November 1986 peaked in
February 1991, was followed by a deceleration for 32 months until October 1993, and then expanded up to March 1997.
3. Noguchi (1999) referred to (1) the development in Asian economies, (2) the progress of network technology, and
(3) the aging population as structural problems which Japan faces, and noted that “problems that Japan’s current
economy faces are structural rather than cyclical.”In the following, we divide the decade into three sub-periods: (1) 1991–93, when
Japan’s economy slowed down, due mainly to a decline in business investment; 
(2) 1994–96, when the economy gained some breathing room with the aid of record
fiscal stimulus measures and monetary easing, notwithstanding the effects of balance-
sheet adjustment and increased global competition; and (3) 1997–99, when the 
economy tumbled into recession again as a result of fiscal consolidation and the adverse
effects of East Asian economic crises, accompanied by financial system instability 
stemming from the worsening nonperforming-asset problem in financial institutions.
A. The Economic Slowdown of 1991–93
Following the Heisei boom, recession continued for 32 months, the second longest
such period since World War II. Stock adjustment of durable goods, housing, and
capital stock all occurred simultaneously, with the resulting decline in final demand
leading the economy into an inventory adjustment phase. These stock and inventory
adjustments, together with the effects of the bursting of the asset price bubbles,
induced a rapid decline in the growth of monetary aggregates.
1. Stock adjustment in the aftermath of the bursting of the asset price bubbles
It is hard to deny that it was the rise in interest rates—the official discount rate was 
set at its peak of 6 percent in August 1990—and the consequent bursting of the 
bubble which triggered the economic slowdown. Residential investment and business
fixed investment by small and medium-sized enterprises, which were the final
demand components most sensitive to changes in interest rates, started to slow down
in spring 1991. In addition, a substantial inventory adjustment started around 1992
(Figure 4). During this phase, the adjustment process for durable goods, residential
stock, and capital stock occurred almost simultaneously (Figure 5). 
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Figure 4  Inventory Cycle (Industrial Production Total)Another marked feature of this period was the fall in asset prices and the rapid
decline in the growth of monetary aggregates. Stock prices, in terms of the Nikkei
225 (Figure 6), fell to ¥14,309 in August 1992, more than 60 percent below the 
peak of ¥38,915 recorded at end-December 1989. The Urban Land Price Index
(commercial land in six major cities, Figure 7) continued to decline after hitting 
a peak in September 1990. Monetary aggregates (M2+CDs, Figure 8) recorded 
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Fixed investment of manufacturing industry
Fixed investment of non-manufacturing industry
Residential investment
Registration of new cars
Note: Data are indexed by setting the peak of 1989/I to 1999/III to 100.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by 
Industry, Quarterly”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National 
Accounts; Japan Automobile Dealers Association, “Registration of New 
Passenger Cars, Trucks, and Buses.”
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Source: The Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
Figure 6  Development of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average (End of Month)negative year-on-year growth in mid-1992 for the first time since the start of this 
statistical series in 1968, reflecting stagnant asset transactions under conditions of
declining asset prices, and a reduction in the demand for funds owing to capital stock
adjustment on the part of firms. The growth of monetary aggregates recovered
slightly thereafter to about 1 percent toward the end of 1993, as bank lending to the
public sector increased, reflecting various fiscal stimulus measures.
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1989/Second half = 100
Note: Data for the first half are those at the end of March, while those for the second 
half are at the end of September.
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, Urban Land Price Index.











Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
Figure 8  Money Stock (M1, M2+CDs, Broadly-Defined Liquidity)2. Monetary easing and the increase in fiscal expenditure
The BOJ reacted to the slowdown of the economy by reducing the official discount 
rate six times from July 1991 to February 1993, by a total of 3.5 percentage points (6.0
percent → 2.5 percent: Figure 2). On the fiscal policy front, three economic stimulus
“packages,” totaling ¥29.9 trillion, were implemented during 1992–93.
In response to these policy measures, residential investment started to recover
from the beginning of 1993. However, business fixed investment remained flat
(Figure 5), as the depth of the needed capital stock adjustment was amplified by
euphoria about the expected upward shift in growth, which ended in a rather abrupt
collapse. The effects of balance-sheet adjustment were most pronounced among small
and medium-sized manufacturers, which used to be highly sensitive to interest rate
declines and whose business fixed investment had tended to recover prior to that of
other sectors in previous monetary easing phases. In fact, the decline in real GDP
growth during this sub-period can be almost totally explained by the decline in 
business fixed investment (Table 2).
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Table 2  Contribution to Year-on-Year Changes in Real GDP by Component
CY 1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
GDP 
5.1 3.8 1.0 0.3 0.6 1.5 5.0 1.6 –2.5 0.3 (year-on-year change, percent)
Private consumption 2.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.7 0.3 –0.3 0.7
Residential investment 0.3 –0.5 –0.3 0.1 0.4 –0.3 0.7 –0.9 –0.6 0.1
Business fixed investment 2.0 1.2 –1.1 –1.9 –0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 –1.4 –1.0
Private inventory –0.2 0.3 –0.5 –0.1 –0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 –0.6 0.1
Government consumption 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Public investment 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 –0.9 –0.2 0.6
Net exports 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.2 –0.3 –0.8 –0.5 1.4 0.5 –0.3
Exports 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.4 –0.3 0.3
Imports (–) –0.8 0.3 0.1 0.0 –0.8 –1.4 –1.3 –0.1 0.9 –0.6




































B. Temporary Economic Recovery in 1994–96
The Japanese economy experienced a temporary recovery in 1994–96, as business
capital stock and inventory adjustments were almost complete. However, with land
prices still declining, business firms maintained their balance-sheet adjustments, and,
on the part of financial institutions, nonperforming-asset problems came increasingly
to the fore, eroding their capital base. It was also during this phase that housing loan
companies (jusen) and some bank-affiliated non-banks, which had lent aggressively 
in the bubble years to small and medium-sized firms that heavily invested in real
estate, financing themselves by borrowings from banks and cooperative-type financial
institutions, collapsed.
1. Recovery endangered by appreciation of the yen and increased global 
competition
In 1994, owing greatly to the effects of successive fiscal and monetary stimulus 
measures, the economy showed signs of a moderate recovery (according to the
Economic Planning Agency [EPA], the economy marked bottom in October 1993).Residential investment continued to increase and inventory adjustments were 
almost completed (Figures 4 and 5). However, several factors prevented the upward
movement from gaining momentum: land prices continued to slide; balance-sheet
adjustment at firms accelerated; and the higher yen forced manufacturing industry to
review the location of their production bases from a global viewpoint.
As the economy entered the year 1995, a chain of events eroded public 
confidence: the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a large fall in stock prices, and the
rapid appreciation of the yen, which reached a high on April 19 of ¥79.75 per U.S.
dollar (Figure 9). In particular, the yen’s appreciation, which came amid a weak
recovery in domestic final demand, severely damaged business sentiment, both
directly and indirectly through the downward pressure on stock market. 
In the meantime, concern over intensified deflationary pressure began to accumu-
late against the backdrop of weak prices (Figure 10). Wholesale prices declined due
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Note: End of month. Data are the exchange rates of yen per U.S. dollar at 5 p.m. in Tokyo.
Source: Bank of Japan.










CY 1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Corporate service price index
Consumer price index
(nationwide, excluding perishables)
Domestic wholesale price index
Note: Excluding the effects of the consumption tax hike in April 1997 on the assumption 
that prices of all taxable goods fully reflect the rise of the tax rate.
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price Index”; Bank of 
Japan, “Wholesale Price Indexes,” “Corporate Service Price Index.”
Figure 10  Prices (Changes from a Year Earlier)to a fall in import prices caused by the appreciation of the yen; even consumer price
inflation (year-on-year basis) temporarily turned negative, reflecting an increase in
low-priced imported manufactured goods from Asian countries. 
2. Policy responses to the rapid appreciation of the yen
In such circumstances, the BOJ successively eased monetary conditions in 1995. The
BOJ urged interbank interest rates to decline at end-March 1995 and reduced the
official discount rate by 0.75 percentage points (from 1.75 percent to 1 percent) 
in April. The BOJ guided market interest rates further down in July and reduced 
the official discount rate again, this time by 0.5 percentage points (from 1 percent 
to 0.5 percent). 
The government, on its part, put forward consecutively in April and June two
economic policy packages, both entitled “Emergency Measures for Yen Appreciation
and the Economy” and chiefly containing measures to promote deregulation and
imports. In addition, concerted foreign exchange market intervention was conducted
in April in response to the G-7 communiqué. Then, in September, the government
launched another fiscal stimulus package of ¥14.2 trillion.
3. Permeation of policy effects and temporary rebound of the economy
These additional policy measures by the government and the BOJ succeeded in 
getting the economy moving from the latter half of 1995 onward. 
Notably, fixed investments of major manufacturing companies relating to personal
computers and telecommunications items such as cellular phones and personal hand
phones marked sizeable growth following deregulation (Figure 11). Owing largely to
this development, overall business fixed investment turned positive in 1995 for the first
time since 1991 on a year-on-year basis.
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Source: Economic Planning Agency, “Machinery Orders Statistics.”












91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Electronic and
telecommunications industries
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Total
Figure 11  Contribution of Electronic and Telecommunications Industries to
Machinery OrdersStock prices (Nikkei 225) rebounded strongly from mid-July onward and hit
¥20,000 by the end of the year. In 1996, public investment by the government as
well as private demand, such as business fixed investment, private consumption,
inventory accumulation and housing investment bolstered the economy, which
posted high 5 percent real annual growth overall (Table 2).
A major reason for this recovery was the progress in adjustment of equipment
stock and reductions in excess liabilities (mainly bank borrowings) at major firms
that had taken place during 1991–93. Deregulation concerning telecommunications
and large-scale retail operations that spurred investment in those industries also 
contributed to this recovery.
4 The effects of low interest rates and the increase in 
public investment became clearly felt in these improved business conditions.
Growth in monetary aggregates (M2+CDs), measured on a year-on-year basis,
rose to 2–3 percent (Figure 8). Fund-raising in capital markets (Figure 12) and bank
lending (Figure 13) increased against the backdrop of the temporary recovery of 
business fixed investment from the latter half of 1995 to 1996, although major firms
continued their efforts at financial restructuring (reducing interest-bearing liabilities).
As business sentiment improved toward mid-1994, by when inventory and stock
adjustments had been completed, the long-term interest rate (on the benchmark 
10-year government bond) reached 4 percent; it declined thereafter to 2 percent in
1996, reflecting a decline in short-term interest rates (Figure 2).
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1. Includes straight bonds, convertible bonds, and bonds with warrants.
2. Estimated by the Bank of Japan.























End of period, year-on-year percentage change End of period, year-on-year percentage change
CY
Figure 12  Amount Outstanding of Corporate Bonds (Year-on-Year Changes)
4. In the mobile communications area, introduction of the outright sales of terminals in April 1994 resulted in a 
dramatic increase in subscribers. The Large-Scale Retail Store Law was amended in May 1994 allowing retailers to
freely open outlets with a sales floor space of less than 1,000 square meters.4. The disposal of nonperforming assets including loans to the jusen and the
erosion of the capital base of financial institutions
As we turn our eyes to the financial system, the nonperforming assets of financial
institutions continued to increase as a whole during this period of temporary eco-
nomic recovery (Figure 14). The asset value of small and medium-sized enterprises,
which had financed their excessive investment in the bubble period by bank borrow-
ings, fell further as the economic recovery was limited and land prices continued to
decline; nonperforming assets increased.
A typical example of excessive investment was seen at bank-affiliated non-banks
and the jusen that had aggressively financed high-risk real estate investments during
the bubble years. The decision on how to dispose of the nonperforming loans to the























1993 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 CY
Lending by domestic commercial banks
2
Lending by domestic commercial banks
2 (adjusted
3)
Year-on-year percentage change Year-on-year percentage change
Notes: 1. Percent changes in average amounts outstanding from a year earlier.
2. “Domestic commercial banks” refers to member banks of the Japanese 
Bankers Association, which consists of city banks, long-term credit banks, 
trust banks (excluding foreign-owned trust banks and trust banks that 
started business after October 1993), the member banks of the Regional 
Banks Association of Japan (regional banks) and the member banks of the 
Second Association of Regional Banks (regional banks II).
3. Adjusted to exclude
(1) fluctuations resulting from the liquidation of loans,
(2) fluctuations in the yen value of foreign currency-denominated loans due 
to changes in exchange rates,
(3) fluctuations resulting from loan write-offs,
(4) the transfer of loans to the former Japan National Railways Settlement 
Corporation to the General Account, and
(5) the transfer of loans to the former Housing Loan Administration 
Corporation to the Resolution and Collection Corporation.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
Figure 13  Lending by Domestic Commercial Banksjusen was delayed because it was a highly political matter as to what extent financial
institutions affiliated with agricultural cooperatives (prefectural credit federations)
should bear the cost of disposal. However, in December 1995 the Cabinet finally
approved the injection of some ¥685 billion of public funds (the Jusen Law was
approved by the Diet in June 1996).
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Figure 14  Risk Management Loans of Major Japanese Banks
Accumulated direct write-offs
Risk management loans
Outstanding amount of specific
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Notes: 1. The above data are the total of those for city banks, long-term credit banks, 
and trust banks.
2. Figures of the risk management loans at March 1993 and March 1994 are the 
total of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans, and those 
at March 1995 and March 1996 include these two and restructured loans.
Source: Financial Services Agency (http://www.fsa.go.jp).Non-banks affiliated with Hyogo Bank, a long-troubled regional bank, were 
liquidated, and many non-banks affiliated with other banks were restructured with
support from their parent banks. A significant number of banks decided to book a
loss, many for the first time, to settle accounts and drew on retained earnings or on
their own capital at the end of fiscal 1995 (end-March 1996, Figure 15).
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Figure 15  Japanese Banks’ Capital Impairment



























Net changes in capital accounts
Net income of banks with surplus
Earned surplus reserve
Capital
Net losses of banks with deficit
Notes: 1. All data in the lower chart are cumulative figures from fiscal 1994.
2. “Capital” is the sum of capital, funds paid in for new shares, and the legal 
reserve.
3. “Net income of banks with surplus” is equal to net income minus dividend 
payments and managing directors’ bonus payments. The term “net losses     
of banks with deficit” is equal to net losses plus dividend payments and 
managing directors’ bonus payments. These adjustments are necessary to 
calculate the changes in capital accounts.
4. “Net changes in capital accounts” indicates recovery of net losses on a stock 
basis in the net capital accounts.
Source: Bank of Japan (1997a).
FYAs these events were highlighted by the media, the serious state of the 
nonperforming-asset problem of Japanese financial institutions became widely 
recognized among the public. Distrust of bank disclosure grew rapidly, especially as
the huge losses incurred by illegal trading and covered up by a rogue trader at Daiwa
Bank’s New York branch came to light. Distrust regarding the stability of Japan’s
financial system was even greater overseas, and the so-called Japan premium recorded
a peak of 50 basis points in October 1995 (Figure 16).
It was at this juncture that the government introduced a package of measures for
securing financial system stability. The Diet passed six bills relating to the financial
stability in June 1996, including bills to liquidate the failed jusen and establish the
Resolution and Collection Bank (a restructured institution of Tokyo Kyodo Bank,
which was originally established to deal with two credit cooperatives, Tokyo Kyowa
and Anzen) and the Housing Loan Administration Corporation.
5
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5. In June 1996, in addition to the so-called “three financial laws,” the Jusen Law (the Law Concerning Special
Packages for Promoting the Disposal of Claims and Debts of Specified Housing Loan Companies), the Law
Concerning Special Packages for Suspending Prescription of Claims Owned by the Specified Jusen, and the Law to
Amend the Agricultural and Fishery Cooperative Savings Insurance Law were all approved and enacted by the
Diet. The “three financial laws” refer to (1) the Law to Implement Measures for Ensuring the Sound Management
of Financial Institutions, which aims at ensuring the management soundness of financial institutions through such
measures as intensive auditing in credit cooperative associations and introduction of prompt corrective action; 
(2) the Special Law Concerning Reorganization of Financial Institutions, which empowered the Financial
Supervisory Agency to initiate bankruptcy procedures against troubled institutions, and also introduced a rehabili-
tation process for credit cooperative associations (in addition to conventional disposal processes such as the transfer
of operations based on consensus among related parties [management, stockholders, and subscribers]); and (3) the
Law to Amend the Deposit Insurance Law, which improved payoff and established a credit purchasing system as
well as introduced special fund assistance within a limited duration (five years) which enabled the Deposit
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Note: The Japan premium is an extra expense a Japanese bank must pay for raising 
funds in overseas financial markets. The Japan premium in this chart is 
calculated as follows: Japan premium = interest rate quoted by Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi – interest rate quoted by Barclays Bank in the Eurodollar market 
(London).
Source: British Bankers’ Association.
Figure 16  Japan Premium in the Eurodollar MarketC. Developments from 1997 to End-1999
In 1997, the government changed its fiscal policy stance and moved toward fiscal
consolidation, including an increase in consumption tax. Shortly after this move,
Japan’s economy was unfortunately affected by the East Asian economic crisis and
deflationary pressure stemming from financial system instability, and fell into a 
serious recession, with real GDP posting negative growth for five consecutive 
quarters from the fourth quarter of 1997 onward. In particular, against the backdrop
of increased concern over financial system stability, consumer sentiment became 
cautious and the financial intermediary function further deteriorated, resulting in an
additional adverse impact on business fixed investment.
Faced with this situation, the government shifted again to an expansionary fiscal
policy from the beginning of 1998 onward and implemented comprehensive 
economic measures, including special tax reduction and an increase in public-sector
investment. It also strengthened the capital base of banks by injecting public funds to
restore financial system stability. With regard to monetary policy, the BOJ adopted 
a “zero interest rate policy” in February 1999. As the effects of these measures 
materialized, the economy finally ceased to decline around spring 1999 and started to
show some signs of improvement toward the end of the year.
1. Serious recession, financial system instability, and fiscal consolidation
The economy encountered various shocks in 1997. 
First, with regard to fiscal policy, various measures for fiscal consolidation were
implemented, based on the Cabinet decision of December 1996. For example, the
initial fiscal 1997 budget included tax increases such as a rise in consumption tax
(from 3 percent to 5 percent), withdrawal of the special tax reduction, and reform of
the medical insurance system (whereby the burden on the insured was increased from
10 percent to 20 percent). Second, in July 1997, the East Asian economic crisis
began, triggered by the large devaluation of the Thai baht. Finally, several major
Japanese financial institutions virtually collapsed in autumn, and the stability of the
financial system was brought into jeopardy.
Obviously, it had been foreseen that fiscal tightening would have negative effects
such as the reaction of rush purchases prior to the increase in consumption tax, but
the consensus forecast among both policy makers and businesses was that these 
negative impacts should fade out by summer. In reality, however, the financial system
instability triggered by the collapse of some financial institutions dampened 
households’ confidence and the average propensity to consume declined, resulting in
a substantial fall in consumption expenditure (Figure 17). In addition, Japan’s exports
declined, reflecting the East Asian crisis (Figure 18).
In 1998, the downward pressure acquired further momentum. Fixed investment
of small and medium-sized non-manufacturers was substantially reduced (Figure 19),
reflecting in the main the stagnant economy and the East Asian crisis; however, 
it cannot be denied that fall in the investment activities was aggravated by the 
nonperforming-asset problems of financial institutions, which caused a further 
deterioration in the functioning of the financial intermediation system.
This decline in final demand intensified inventory adjustment pressure, and 
production activity shrank significantly. The economy was thus caught in a vicious
68 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001cycle (decline in demand → decline in production activity → decline in corporate
profits and labor income → further decline in business fixed investment and private
consumption), with real GDP recording negative growth for five consecutive quarters
from the fourth quarter of 1997 onward (for the first time since the start of GDP 
statistics in 1955).
69
Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review























































Seasonally adjusted, 1990 = 100 Seasonally adjusted, 1990 = 100
NRI Consumer’s Sentiment 
Index (right scale)
Consumer Sentiment Indexes (left scale)
Consumer Forecasting 
Indicator (left scale)
Notes: 1. Seasonally adjusted by X-11. “Consumer Sentiment Indexes” is seasonally 
adjusted by the Economic Planning Agency.
2. Consumer Sentiment Indexes, Consumer Forecasting Indicator, and NRI 
Consumer’s Sentiment Index are based on surveys on consumer 
confidence.
3. Data are plotted at the months of each survey.
4. Consumer Sentiment Index is surveyed by the Economic Planning Agency, 
“Consumer Forecasting Indicator” by Nikkei RIM, and NRI Consumer’s 
Sentiment Index” by NRI.













1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 CY
3-month moving average
Note: Seasonally adjusted by Management and Coordination Agency.
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, “Consumer Behavior Survey”; Nikkei Research 
Institute of Industry and Markets (Nikkei RIM), “Consumption Forecasting 
Indicator”; Management and Coordination Agency, “Monthly Report on the 
Family Income and Expenditure Survey”; Nippon Research Institute (NRI), 
“Consumer’s Sentiment Survey.”
[2] Propensity to Consume (Family Income and Expenditure Survey)









Seasonally adjusted quarter-to-quarter change, percent
Others
ASEAN 4 + Korea
United States + European Union Real exports total
1994 CY 95 96 97 98 99
Notes: 1. Seasonally adjusted by X-11.
2. ASEAN 4 consists of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
Source: Ministry of Finance, “The Summary Report on Trade of Japan.”
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[1] Manufacturing Large Firms
¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted
[3] Non-Manufacturing Large Firms
¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted
[4] Non-Manufacturing Medium and Small Firms
¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted
Source: Ministry of Finance, “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly.”
Total
[2] Manufacturing Medium and Small Firms
¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted
Excluding gas and electric power
companies
Figure 19  Business Fixed Investment by Industry and Scale2. Policy responses to the recession
In 1998, however, the government decided to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in
response to the deteriorating economy. 
Specifically, the government took successive measures deviating from its fiscal
consolidation line, including (1) a ¥2 trillion special tax reduction in February, 
(2) the announcement of a ¥16 trillion total economic stimulus package in April, and
(3) a revision of the Fiscal Structure Reform Law in June (enacted in November
1997), postponing the target year for a reduction in the fiscal deficit to fiscal 2005
(and temporarily freezing the law in December). In addition, the government intro-
duced measures to encourage banks to lend to small and medium-sized companies
such as the expansion of the special public loan-guarantee scheme in August. As the 
economic downturn did not come to a halt by autumn in spite of these measures,
and as employment and income condition deteriorated further, the government drew
up an additional ¥24 trillion emergency economic package. 
The economy finally showed some gradual signs of ceasing to deteriorate toward
the end of 1998, and real GDP growth (compared with previous quarter, seasonally
adjusted) turned to post substantial positive growth of 1.5 percent in the first quarter
of 1999. Then, in the spring of 1999, the financial system saw its stability restored to
some extent, owing greatly to the injection of public funds into major financial 
institutions (in March 1999, the total that had been injected amounted to about
¥7.5 trillion for 15 major banks). In addition, residential investment rebounded in
response to special tax cuts for mortgage holders.
The BOJ, for its part, reduced short-term interest rates in September 1998 
(guiding the uncollateralized overnight call-loan rate down to 0.25 percent). Then, in
February 1999, it encouraged a further reduction in short-term interest rates—the zero
interest rate policy (Figure 2). Such policy action was adopted in order to prevent an
accumulation of deflationary pressures and a further deterioration in the economy.
6
To this end, the BOJ announced that it would “flexibly provide ample funds and
encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible.”
7
Furthermore, in April, the BOJ announced that it would commit itself to the zero
interest rate policy “until deflationary concerns are dispelled,” intending to stabilize
market expectations regarding short-term interest rates from the overnight call rate to
longer terms at low levels, thereby maximizing the effects of monetary easing.
8
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6. In the announcement of February 12, 1999, the Bank referred to background economic and financial develop-
ments that prompted the policy change as “corporate and household sentiments remain cautious and private sector
activities stagnant . . . . Long-term interest rates have risen considerably, and the yen has been appreciating against
the dollar.”
7. At the press conference on April 17,1999, BOJ Governor Hayami stated, “I understand that the Bank of Japan
will continue with the current policy, which encourages the unsecured overnight call rate to move around virtually
zero percent by providing ample funds, with paying due consideration to maintaining the proper functioning of
the market until deflationary concerns subside.”
8. In the announcement of the Monetary Policy Meeting decisions up to September 21, 1999, the Bank’s concern at
the initial stage of the zero interest rate policy was stated in expressions such as “to avoid excessive volatility in the
short-term financial markets” and “by paying due consideration to maintaining market function.” At the meeting
on October 13, however, such expressions were excluded since it became inappropriate in accordance with the
changes in financial market conditions. In addition, the guideline as a whole was changed to state more explicitly
the meaning of and the intention behind the zero interest rate policy, as quoted in the text.As the effects of these fiscal and monetary policy measures were diffused, 
the economy gradually improved toward the end of the year. However, this improve-
ment was mainly due to public-sector demand and external demand reflecting the
recovery of Asian economies; we are yet to see clear signs of a sustained growth in 
private demand.
3. Financial system instability: the collapse of major financial institutions and
policy responses
This period (1997–99) was characterized by the growing concern over financial 
system stability. In November 1997, as Sanyo Securities collapsed and this collapse
was followed by the collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities,
the market was suddenly looking for the next candidate to fail, and concern over the
loss of financial system stability and the possibility of systemic risk spread rapidly. A
number of financial institutions came under severe attack: the rumor that they had
incurred huge nonperforming assets drove down their stock prices and triggered 
sizeable outflow of deposits. Moreover, the Japan premium rose close to 100 basis
points, reflecting the difficulty of fund-raising in overseas interbank markets, while
some banks hastened to raise money to cover year-end funding (Figure 16).
In order to cope with this situation and contain the turmoil, the BOJ extended
special loans to Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities and provided,
from late November onward, ample reserves in excess of the volume necessary for the
banks to meet their legal reserve requirements (Figure 20). 






Outstanding of overdraft accounts other
than required reserve at the Bank of Japan
Outstanding of excess reserve
Outstanding of reserve requirement
Note: Data are average amounts per day from the 16th of the month to the 15th of 
the next month.
Source: Bank of Japan.
¥ trillions
CY 1997 98 99
Figure 20  Reserve Requirement and Excess ReserveNotwithstanding these efforts, financial institutions adopted a stringent attitude
toward lending to firms in general, and toward lending to small and medium-sized
enterprises in particular. Facing funding difficulties, the business condition of the 
latter naturally worsened rapidly (Figure 21). Corporate bankruptcies increased and
fixed investments by small and medium-sized enterprises decreased. It became
increasingly recognized that a decline in the financial intermediation function was
hampering economic recovery.
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DI (“accommodative” – “severe”), percentage points
1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 CY 00














DI (“easy” – “tight”), percentage points
1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 CY 00
Source: Bank of Japan, “Tankan—Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan.”
[2] Financial PositionThis recognition brought again to the fore the importance of injecting public
funds into financial institutions so as to correct their undercapitalized status, thus
revitalizing their financial intermediation function. In March 1998 some ¥1.8 trillion
in public funds was injected into 21 major banks. In October, public funds appropri-
ated for financial system stabilization, based on the Financial Reconstruction Law
and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law, were increased to ¥60 trillion
and an additional ¥7.5 trillion was injected into 15 major banks, followed by a ¥2.6
billion injection into four regional banks. In the meantime, the Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank, both suffering from huge nonperforming
assets, were placed under special public administration in accordance with the
Financial Reconstruction Law in October and December 1998, respectively.
III. Mechanism behind the Prolonged Economic Stagnation
after the Bursting of the Asset Price Bubble
The prolonged economic stagnation that occurred in the 1990s was the outcome of
the interaction of various factors. Hayakawa (1999), for example, stresses the follow-
ing four: (1) the existence of “nonperforming assets” as an aftermath of the bursting
of the asset price bubble; (2) a high household savings rate reflecting the rapid aging
of the population and a decline in the fertility rate; (3) a decline in capital efficiency;
and (4) low productivity in non-manufacturing industry.
9 The authors of this paper
agree that the background to the prolonged economic stagnation in the 1990s was
multifaceted, and that the negative impact of the asset bubble constituted only a part
of this complex structure. In any event, it is obvious that it is premature at this
moment to conclude what the fundamental factors behind the prolonged economic
stagnation were. We have to wait at least for some more years before the Japanese
economy completes the post-bubble adjustments.
Nevertheless, even though it is too early to reach a firm conclusion regarding the
identity of a fundamental factor behind the prolonged economic stagnation, there
should be little doubt that the emergence, expansion, and subsequent bursting of 
the asset price bubble played a major role in determining business conditions in the
1990s. We therefore focus in this section on the role that “nonperforming assets”
played in prolonging the economic stagnation of the post-bubble years. 
The working hypothesis regarding the adjustment mechanism of the bursting of
the bubble to be examined here is as follows: (1) the impacts of the bursting of the
bubble were amplified by the decline in expected growth rate, and malfunctioning of
the financial system stemming from balance-sheet adjustment in the nonfinancial
sector and nonperforming assets in the banking sector; (2) such amplified impacts
prolonged the adjustment period, thus, aggravating the negative impacts on real 
economic activities. 
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9. For the details of each point, see Nakagawa (1999), Maeda and Yoshida (1999), and Bank of Japan (1999).A. Effects of Delayed Stock Adjustment
With regard to the recession after the bursting of the bubble, a commonly expressed
argument is that excess accumulation of capital stock during the bubble period
amplified the resultant adjustment pressure.
1. Decline in expected growth rate and required stock adjustment
Although the Heisei boom peaked in February 1991 according to the EPA’s reference
dates of the business cycle, real business fixed investment of manufacturing continued
to grow in the second quarter of 1991; moreover, it was only in the third quarter of
1992 that investment in non-manufacturing industry reached its peak (Figure 5). 
At around the peak of the business cycle in 1990–91, capital stock was growing at 
8 percent per annum, and the ratio of business fixed investment to nominal GDP
moved up to around 20 percent (Figure 22), both the highest figures since the first oil
crisis. It is a widely shared view that this surge in investment was based on high growth
expectations, especially that at the micro level, that is, entrepreneurs tended to believe
that demand growth for their industry, at least, would remain high (Figure 23).
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Note: Shaded periods are those of economic expansion.
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.








FY 1981 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
Source: Economic Planning Agency, “Report on Survey Research of Firms’ Behavior.”
Expected economic growth 
for the coming three years
Expected growth of the demand for
industries for the coming three years
Year-on-year percentage change
Figure 23  Firms’ Expected Growth RatesHowever, as these growth expectations were revised downwards (from close to 
4 percent to barely above 2 percent), growth in capital stock, and the ratio of business
fixed investment to nominal GDP declined remarkably. The fact that the capital 
utilization rate remained low throughout the stock adjustment period (Figure 24) 
suggests that the period during which adjustment pressure was apparent was prolonged
by the excessive investment that occurred during the last stage of the bubble period. 
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2. Adjustment in stock of structures
One of the significant characteristics of the bubble period is that the expansion of
capital stock appeared particularly in investment in structures (Bank of Japan
[1997b]). A typical example is the large increase of floor space in the Tokyo metro-
politan area, triggered by the increase in demand for high-quality office buildings
that took place in the late 1980s. Construction of a number of large office buildings
with long building periods was begun in 1990–91, the very last years of the Heisei
boom, prolonging the capital stock adjustment process that followed.
10
B. Balance-Sheet Adjustment and Deterioration of Financial Intermediation 
The bursting of the bubble initiated not only capital stock adjustment but also 
balance-sheet adjustments, as companies’ assets lost their value and/or became 
nonperforming. The other side of the same coin was the growth in the number of
10. Relating to this point, Yoshikawa and Ohara (1997) reported that construction in process in fixed assets, as a
proxy for a large-scale fixed investment such as factory construction and other large building projects, increased
remarkably in 1990–91. Based on such findings, they argued that complete adjustment of capital stock took a

















Year-on-year percentage change 1990 = 100, seasonally adjusted
Business fixed investment
 (real term, left scale)
Capacity utilization index (right scale)
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, “Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises”;
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, “Monthly Statistics of Machinery.”
 
Figure 24  Capital Utilization Index and Business Fixed Investmentdebtors who became unable to honor their debts. Thus nonperforming assets became
a serious problem for financial institutions and eroded their capital base. This means
that the risk-taking capacity of the financial institutions deteriorated; in other words,
the banks’ financial intermediary function deteriorated. Difficulty in bank borrowing
for small and medium-sized firms that have only limited access, if any, to capital 
markets became a significant hurdle for recovery in investment activity. 
1. The magnitude of the nonperforming-asset problem
It is often emphasized that what made Japan’s nonperforming-asset problem worse
was the aggressive lending behavior of banks in real estate-related industries: real
estate development, the construction industry and non-banks. Such aggressive 
lending was triggered by the rapid increase in the land prices, as well as by the slow
and incomplete deregulation of the financial system in the 1980s.
11 True, rapid asset
price inflation during and after the progress of financial liberalization have been
observed elsewhere: cases in point are U.S. savings and loan and bank crises in the
Nordic countries.
12 However, the magnitude of nonperforming-asset problems in
Japan exceeded such experiences.
The upper panel of Figure 11 shows the movement of nonperforming assets at
major Japanese banks.
13 “Risk management loans” at end-March 1999 stood at ¥20.3
trillion (4.0 percent of nominal GDP), compared with ¥12.8 trillion (2.7 percent) in
March 1993, notwithstanding the fact a large quantity of bad loans were written
off.
14 Taking into account the latter, total amount of nonperforming loans, i.e., risk
management loans plus accumulated direct write-offs since fiscal 1992, reached
¥44.6 trillion (9.0 percent of nominal GDP) at end-March 1999, slightly above the
level it had recorded at end-September 1999, or ¥44.3 trillion (8.9 percent).
Although its growth has become marginal recently, the peak has yet to be confirmed. 
Since the 1980s, the banking industry in many countries has experienced 
nonperforming-asset problems. For example, nonperforming loans in the United
States (commercial banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)
increased in 1990-91, recording US$117 billion (2.0 percent of nominal GDP) at
the end of the second quarter of 1991 (Figure 25), and adding to that amount the
sum of direct write-offs since the last quarter of 1986, the accumulated amount of
nonperforming loans reached US$251.2 billion (4.1 percent).
Comparing the magnitude of nonperforming-asset problems across countries 
is difficult. However, is seems safe to conclude that Japan’s nonperforming-loan 
problem was more serious than that experienced in the United States. 
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11. For example, Hoshi (2001) empirically examines the relevance of gradual and incomplete financial liberalization
as one of the factors that caused the nonperforming-asset problem in Japan. In his study, it is shown that (1) the
size of nonperforming assets is largely attributable to the growth of real estate lending in the 1980s, and that 
(2) the growth of real estate lending was in turn caused by the experience of losing customers to capital markets. 
12. Okumura (1999), for instance, referred to a conference paper authored by IMF economists, which pointed 
out the following three common factors behind the banking crises that coexisted in those countries under 
financial liberalization: (1) insufficient internal governance, such as weak discipline by the management within 
financial institutions; (2) weak market discipline, such as insufficient monitoring of financial institution 
management through market forces; and (3) inadequacy of the financial regulation, supervision, and examination
by the authorities.
13. Major banks include city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks.
14. “Risk management loans” include (1) loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, (2) past due loans in arrears by
three months or more, and (3) restructured loans.2. The malfunctioning of financial intermediation and its macroeconomic
impact
The increase in nonperforming assets in the banking sector exerted a considerable
negative impact on macroeconomic activity through the deterioration of financial
intermediation. 
Recent literature on banking under conditions of asymmetric information 
provides a useful viewpoint from which to examine issues regarding the malfunction-
ing of financial intermediation.
15 The informational asymmetry between borrowers
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Note: Data for FDIC-insured commercial banks. Nonperforming loans include those 
past their due date by 90 or more days, those in non-accrual status, and OREO.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile.
15. For the standard analytical framework for discussing the macroeconomic effects of financial intermediation, see,
for example, Chapter 6 of Freixas and Rochet (1997).and lenders creates market imperfection by generating agency costs, which Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) called the external finance premium. The size of this premium
depends on the borrowers’ financial position. The amount of bank lending, and thus
the investment decisions of firms in general, and of bank-dependent small and
medium-sized firms in particular, are very sensitive to their financial positions.
16
Based on this theoretical argument, we summarize Japan’s experience in the 1990s
as follows. First, in the companies sector, the decline in asset prices lowered the net
worth of firms and raised agency costs with regard to their external financing.
Second, in the banking sector, the continuous land price slide and prolonged 
economic stagnation amplified their nonperforming-asset problem and weakened
their financial intermediary function, with the resultant credit crunch imposing an
additional hindrance to business investment. 
The results of the existing studies tend to support the view that: First, the 
decline in asset prices restricted firms’ investment behavior throughout the 1990s, by
causing a deterioration in their balance sheet and net worth, magnifying agency costs,
and thus aggravating their credit constraint (Gibson [1997], Suzuki and Ogawa
[1997], and Ogawa and Kitasaka [1998]);
17 Second, major banks began to attach
greater importance in the post-bubble period to the profitability of loans to 
non-manufacturing and small and medium-sized manufacturers, reflecting the
increase in agency cost as a result of the decline in asset prices (Ogawa and Kitasaka
[2000]); Third, especially since the fall of 1997 when concern over the stability of the
financial system mounted, nonperforming assets eroded banks’ capital bases and
aggravated the malfunctioning of financial intermediation, which appeared as a credit
crunch (Horiye [1999], and Motonishi and Yoshikawa [1999]).
18
To sum up, the decreased functioning of financial intermediation restrained 
business fixed investment throughout the 1990s, to some extent. Such effects have
manifested themselves in a particularly noticeable way since 1997. 
IV. Monetary Policy Responses
We now turn to the very tentative evaluation of monetary policy responses to develop-
ments in the 1990s. In evaluating the validity of policy responses, we think it is of
utmost importance to weigh what was (or was not) achieved against the explicit and
potential costs, as well as to examine the political and social environment policy 
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16. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) refer to the amplification mechanism of initial shocks through changes in
credit market conditions stemming from cyclical movements in firms’ net worth and cash flow as the “financial
accelerator.” Changes in firms’ net worth as a collateral for borrowing from banks arise from movements of asset
prices, affecting agency costs and thus credit conditions, and then affecting firms’ investment behavior.
17. In particular, the effects of the malfunctioning of financial intermediation appear asymmetrically between 
large firms and small and medium-sized firms, reflecting the difference in degree of bank-dependence. Empirical 
studies that focus on the asymmetric effects resulting from differences in firm size indicate that credit constraints
became more serious in the small and medium-sized firms, which find it more difficult to gain access to capital
markets and are thus highly dependent on bank lending. 
18. Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) estimate the effect of financial factors, using the BOJ’s Tankan diffusion 
index of bank lending attitudes as a proxy for business fixed investment by non-manufacturing and small and
medium-sized firms, and argue that business fixed investment and real GDP are lowered by 10 percentage points
and 1.6 percentage points, respectively.makers had to face. This is even more the case because the period under review was a
most unusual one in that it occurred in the midst of a collapse of the bubble economy. 
We first examine the timing of policy change, then the tempo and scale of 
monetary easing.
A. What Monetary Policy Achieved
An obvious achievement of monetary policy during the years under consideration is
that while Japan was faced with a tremendous decline in asset prices, which came
close to that experienced in the United States during the Great Depression, the CPI
has so far remained stable. In other words, a rapid and self-sustaining price decline
known as deflation, as was experienced in the United States during the Great
Depression (Figure 26), has been successfully avoided.
In fact, as a result of the BOJ’s historically unprecedented accommodative 
monetary policy, interest rates in Japan have recently declined more rapidly and to a
lower level than in the United States during the Great Depression (Figure 27). There
is no doubt that this policy contributed considerably to the prevention of monetary
contraction and deflation as was experienced in the United States during the Great
Depression (Figure 26). However, it is also obvious that Japanese economy has
remained stagnant for a long time. Was monetary policy responsible for this 
long-lasting economic slump, and if so, to what extent?
Growth of monetary aggregates (M2+CDs) cannot answer this question. True, it
has remained low, and it has recently been hovering at around 2.5 percent per annum.
19
However, as a result of the BOJ’s accommodative monetary easing, it has risen, slowly
but steadily, while real annual GDP growth remained virtually flat at around 1 percent. 
We have to examine in somewhat more detail the adequacy of the timing of 
policy reversal, and the speed and size of monetary easing. 
B. Was Monetary Reversal to Easing Delayed? 
The first move toward monetary relaxation after the bursting of the asset price 
bubble was the official discount rate cut in July 1991 (6.0 → 5.5 percent). Critics 
of the BOJ argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that this move was “too late and 
too timid” and failed to prevent an “overkill” of the economy. In the following, we
examine whether the timing of that monetary policy change, i.e. the switch from a
tight to an easy monetary policy, was appropriate. Then we examine the tempo and
magnitude of policy responses. 
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19. The characteristics of economic stagnation during this period have been clearly observed in the contributing 
factors for monetary aggregates. In this regard, Shirakawa (2000) stated as follows:
Looking at the change in the assets of financial institutions corresponding to the above increase in money
supply, their loans to the private sector have grown only 6 percent, significantly lower than the 62 percent
increase in their credit (bond purchases, etc.) to the government. Needless to say, reductions in interest rates
by the Bank of Japan will not automatically lead to an increase in money supply unless financial institutions
respond to such rate cuts. Money supply will only grow if financial institutions engage in credit creation
activities in response to declines in interest rates, i.e., making loans to firms after appropriate assessment of
their borrowing plans, and also investing in securities. A small increase in loans to the private sector, which is
in sharp contrast to credit extended to the government, vividly illustrates that financial institutions have had
few profitable lending opportunities given their risk taking capacity.81
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US: Dow Jones Industrial Average
 (1929/I–1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)
Japan: CPI (nationwide, excluding
perishables, 1989/IV = 100)
United States: CPI (1929/I–
1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)
Japan: M2+CD 
(1989/IV = 100)
United States: M2 (1929/I–
1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)
Notes: 1. Japanese CPI data are adjusted by excluding the effects of the consumption 
tax increase in April 1997 on the assumption that prices of all taxable goods 
fully reflect the tax rate rise.
2. Data for stock prices, consumer prices, and money stocks are quarterly 
average.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price 
Index”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts; 
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun; Bloomberg; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau  
of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index”; Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, 
“Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The American Business Cycle, 
University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Stock Prices Real GDP
Consumer Prices Money Stock
Figure 26  Comparison of Stock Price, Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Money
Stock (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Great Depression in 
the United States)1. Timing
The BOJ’s first step toward monetary easing was the cut in the official discount rate
from 6 to 5.5 percent in July 1991, which was followed by four successive cuts that
brought the rate down to 3.25 percent by 1992. The official discount rate was thus
reduced by a total of 2.75 percentage points in a period of one year. 
How should we evaluate the adequacy of the timing of policy reversal? The
Japanese economy had marked a peak in February 1991, according to the reference
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Figure 27  Comparison of Interest Rates (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Great
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U.S. CP rate (4–6 months)
(1929/I–1937/IV)
Call rate (overnight, uncollateralized)
CP rate (3-month)
Quarterly
Notes: 1. Japanese interest rates: 1991/I–1999/II. U.S. interest rates: 1929/I–1937/IV.
2. The horizontal scale is graduated for the Japanese case, while 1991/I in the 
scale corresponds to 1929/I for the U.S. data.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve Board, Financial and Business Statistics; 
Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, “Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The 
American Business Cycle, University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Percentdates of business cycles that the EPA set retroactively.
20 CPI inflation had peaked in
the first quarter of 1991 (when consumer prices increased by 3.2 percent from a year
earlier), and kept rising by more than 3 percent per year until the third quarter of
1991. We have also to take into account that the Gulf War had just ended in
February 1991, and its lagged impact on prices was not yet certain. 
Against this background, it should be fair to conclude that it is difficult to make a
strong case against the timing of the policy reversal, especially taking into account the
time lag with which macroeconomic indicators became available to policy makers.
2. The speed and magnitude of monetary easing
How, then, about the tempo and magnitude of monetary relaxation? In the 
following, we will try to tackle this harder question basing ourselves on four criteria:
monetary aggregates, the so-called “Taylor rule,” the equity yield spread, and the real
short-term interest rates.
a. Monetary aggregates
As Okina (1993) pointed out, judgment on the growth rates of monetary aggregates
should differ depending on whether the preceding phase was a normal situation, or a
period of excess supply. In this context, we have to bear in mind that M2+CDs had
shown double-digit growth rates in the late 1980s.
We therefore focus on the Marshallian k (the inverse of the velocity of monetary
aggregates)—i.e., the ratio of monetary aggregates to nominal GDP—in terms of
both M2+CDs and the monetary base, and compare its movement with the historical
trend computed for the period of 1970–86 (Figure 28).
21
Marshallian k in terms of M2+CDs started to exceed its historical trend (excess in
monetary aggregates) from 1987, when the growth rate of M2+CDs reached double
digits. The upward deviation peaked in 1990. While k started to decline rapidly soon
after the collapse of the asset price bubble, deviation from the trend has remained
constant since end-1992. Thus the Marshallian k in terms of M2+CDs had been
consistently exceeding the historical trend. 
Marshallian k in terms of monetary base, similar to that of M2+CDs, showed 
significant upward deviation from its historical trend during the bubble era, and
peaked in 1990. Then, following a temporary contraction of upward deviations up 
to 1992, the deviation began to widen further due to the growth in demand for 
banknotes, which is a major component of the monetary base, reflecting the decline
in opportunity cost of holding cash balances. 
It is difficult to argue by using these charts that the volume of monetary 
aggregates was insufficient;
22 on the contrary, ample liquidity was provided.
23
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20. The committee on defining the reference date of business cycles tentatively set a peak at April 1991 in November
1993, then finalized a peak at February 1991 in July 1996. 
21. Series of monetary base are adjusted for the impact of changes in reserve requirement rates.
22. However, as we point out in Footnote 19, the change in the assets of financial institutions corresponding to 
the increase in monetary aggregates came mainly from increased holding of the Japanese government bonds,
while their loans to the private sector were stagnant. In this sense, the effects of balance-sheet adjustments were
significant, and the impact of the increase in monetary aggregates was dampened. 
23. Looking at the diffusion index of the lending attitudes of financial institutions, which is a rather subjective 
judgmental indicator, it turned to an accommodative direction soon after the transition to a policy of monetary
easing. Financial conditions for firms were not so tight, except for the period from the fall of 1997 to 1998, when
the impact of the credit crunch was accentuated.The fact that the upward deviation from its trend of the Marshallian k in terms of
monetary base has expanded steadily since 1992, while that in terms of M2+CDs
remained unchanged from 1992 to 1996 and temporarily declined to trend level in
1997 seems to indicate that the increase in monetary base failed to exert a positive
effect due to the malfunctioning of the financial intermediation system.
24
b. Taylor rule
We now examine the speed and size of the reduction in short-term interest rates with
reference to the second criterion, the policy reaction function based on the Taylor
rule (Taylor [1993]).
25
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Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly; Economic 
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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[2] Monetary Base
24. It should be noted that the decline in the money multiplier in 1999 mainly reflects the excess monetary base
under the zero interest rate policy that reduced the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. In fact, although
the financial crisis was accentuated in 1997–98, such concerns subsided in 1999 as a result of the fact that the
Japanese government adopted a reactive policy, including an increased infusion of public funds.
25. Meyer (2000) emphasized that the Taylor rule is an attractive and simple guidepost for the conduct of a 
discretionary monetary policy, because it “responds directly to deviations from the Federal Reserve’s objectives—
price stability and an equilibrium utilization rate” as well as because “it incorporates a preemptive response to
inflation” and “is closely aligned both with the objectives of monetary policy and with the model that governs
inflation dynamics.” However, it should be noted that one important assumption for the Taylor rule is that the
potential growth rate remains unchanged, and this assumption might not always hold. In fact, Orphanides et al.We compare the movements of the call rate with that of the target rate, which 
is derived using Taylor-rule policy reaction function, starting from the second 
quarter of 1991, when the call rate peaked (Figure 29).
26 We assumed two types of
parameters in applying the Taylor rule: one lays similar weights on both the inflation
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Rt = uncollateralized overnight call rates at t-period;   t+4 –   * = the difference 
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real GDP gap at t-period (actual real GDP minus potential real GDP);     = 0 
in perfect adjustment rule;     = 0.85 in partial adjustment rule.
2. The data above are the changes in interest rates (actual call rates or    
target rates calculated by the baseline formula of Taylor’s rule) from the 
rates in the 1991/II (when the first move to monetary easing in the 1990s 
was made).
Sources: Bank of Japan; Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price 
Index”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
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(1999) pointed out that measurement errors in the GDP gap, stemming from ex post revision of the statistics, are
so large that policy judgment could be different if real-time data were used instead of the ex post revised data.
Although, the impacts of measurement errors in the GDP gaps are not examined in Japan, the ex post policy 
evaluation based on Taylor rule is not free from this kind of criticism based on hindsight.
26. Since we compare the cumulative reduction in interest rates from the second quarter of 1991, our simulation
results are unaffected by the parameter assumptions in the Taylor rule, such as those of equilibrium real 
short-term interest rate and target inflation rate.rate and GDP gap (the parameters for the inflation rate and GDP gap are 1.5 and
1.0, respectively), the other much greater weight to the inflation rate than on the
GDP gap (2.0 and 0.3).
27 We also assume the two formulas of the Taylor rule, i.e.
both with and without interest rate smoothing (partial and total adjustment 
mechanisms), where the adjustment parameter of the former is assumed to be 0.85.
The call rate declined approximately six percentage points from the second 
quarter of 1991 to the first quarter of 1994. During the same period, target rates
derived from the Taylor rule declined six to eight percentage points, according to 
the model. The pace of decline in the target rate was faster in the case in which 
similar weights were applied to the inflation rate and the GDP gap. In general, the
deviations between call rate and estimated target rate remained relatively limited.
The results suggest that we may rate monetary policy as having responded 
properly to external shocks on inflation and GDP as captured by the Taylor rule.
c. Equity yield spread
The third criterion is the movement of equity yield spread relative to that of the
interest rates.
An important mechanism that brought the asset price bubble to an end is that the
process by which a decline in expected growth adjusted for risk premium, caused by
either a lower expected growth rate or a higher risk premium, or both, has effects
similar to those of a rise in interest rates: both lower expected growth rate and higher
risk premium raise the effective cost of funds even though nominal interest rates
remain unchanged.
Against the backdrop of extremely bullish sentiment during the bubble expansion
period, a marginal increase in interest rates did not much alter private expectations
regarding the future course of the economy. In order to have some meaningful
impact in such a situation, any rise in interest rates had to be large enough to 
influence private expectations. On the contrary, even if the initial impact of a rise 
in interest rates was insignificant, it would start “biting” seriously once private 
expectations were reversed, since the original impact of higher interest rates would
become amplified by the effect of revised growth expectations.
The equity yield spread provides a useful proxy for private expectations regarding
economic growth (Figure 30).
28 It widened even after the monetary policy stance was
tightened in 1989; it was only in the fall of 1990 that the yield spread showed the
first signs of contraction. The spread shrank rather rapidly thereafter: it had declined
by two percentage points by the end of 1990, and by a further two percentage points
after monetary policy moved toward easing in July 1991.
It is thus possible to argue that the speed and magnitude of monetary easing up 
to 1992 was broadly in line with this movement of the equity yield spread. That is,
the official discount rate was lowered five times to 3.25 percent from 6 percent by
2.75 percent points during the period from July 1991 to July 1992.
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27. Parameters for the Taylor rule are taken from Kimura and Tanemura (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
However, it should be noted the later estimation is conducted with monthly data, thus it employs the deviation
of the index of industrial production from its trend instead of the GDP gap.
28. As Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) point out regarding the period of expansion of the asset price 
bubble, it is not important to decompose the effects of the lower expected growth rate and of the increased risk
premium, since both affect asset prices in the same direction so that asset prices will decline.However, one may also point out that the equity yield spread had declined by two
percentage points prior to the shift in expansionary policy. In light of the aforemen-
tioned view, it is possible to argue that the effect of higher interest rates becomes
amplified when public expectations are revised downwards. Thus, it might be the
case that a sharper rate cut was required after July 1991, when the monetary policy
stance was reversed toward easing. 
d. Real short-term interest rate
As a fourth yardstick, we compare, as suggested by Blinder (1998), real short-term
interest rates with a benchmark, or “neutral,” real interest rate which we obtained
from long-run historical data. 
As the neutral real short-term interest rate, we chose the average ex post real 
interest rate, that is the official discount rate minus realized year-on-year consumer
price inflation during the period 1883–1986.
29 We obtained a neutral real short-term
interest rate of 2.85 percent by excluding as extraordinary the period around World
War II, and 1.72 percent if we exclude the observations when of real interest 
rate exceeding 10 percent in absolute terms (i.e., over 10 percent or under minus 
10 percent). In the following evaluation, we assume that the “true” neutral real 
short-term rate should lie somewhere between these two estimates.
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29. Before the 1980s, deposit and loan rates were linked to the official discount rate under the system of regulated
interest rates. Therefore, the historical series of the official discount rate could be reasonably used as a benchmark
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Figure 30  Equity Yield SpreadReal short-term rates remained relatively high at around 5 percent after the 
bursting of the bubble (Figure 31), but they gradually began to fall after July 1991,
when the BOJ’s monetary policy stance was reversed, and declined to around 
4 percent by end-1991. It then accelerated on its downward trend and by mid-1992
was fluctuating at around 2 percent, or approximately the lower bound of the 
“neutral rate zone.” Real short-term interest rates continued to fall; from late-1993 to
mid-1994 they remained well below the neutral rate zone. Real rates briefly rose 
to the lower bound of neutral rate zone in early 1995, but again fell sharply to 
0.5 percent, reflecting the monetary easing adopted to cope with the rapid yen 
appreciation that occurred during the first half of 1995.
In retrospect, this movement of real short-term interest rates could be interpreted
as follows. The real interest rate had to be kept two percentage points above the 
neutral rate for more than one and half years in order to offset the inflationary 
pressure of the Heisei boom. Such a high real rate was, then, adjusted smoothly to
the neutral level along with the transition to easy monetary policy in mid-1991.
However, the downward movement of the real interest rate slowed down thereafter.
Moreover, during mid-1994 and early 1995, real short-term interest rates instead
moved upwards to the neutral level, since the inflation rate went down while nominal
interest rate was flat.
As nonperforming-loan problems in U.S. financial institutions came to the fore
and the credit crunch became serious, the Fed left the real short-term rate below the
neutral rate from end-1991 to mid-1994; especially in the first half of 1993 it was
about zero or even negative (Figure 32). Such U.S. experience, if compared with that
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Figure 31  Short-Term Real Interest Rates in Japanof Japan, might suggest that in order to cope with deflationary pressure amplified by
the collapse of asset price bubbles some additional monetary stimulus would have
been useful.
e. Evaluation of policy reactions: a tentative summary
Let us sum up the discussion on the evaluation of policy reaction based on our four
criteria. The results are rather mixed.
First, the movements of monetary aggregates hardly suggest that the volume 
of monetary aggregates was insufficient if compared with the level of nominal GDP
at that time. We may also argue quite safely on the results of Taylor-type reaction
function that the speed and size of monetary easing were broadly adequate in the
light of the then prevailing business conditions and inflation indicators. It seems
appropriate to say that the reaction of monetary policy was rather swift to the extent
it was taken against the background of a normal business contraction with stock
adjustments, in spite of economic and social environment at that time that made it
difficult to reverse the policy direction toward monetary easing. However, looking at
the equity yield spread, it is not impossible to argue that the degree of monetary 
easing was insufficient for offsetting the initial shock of the burst of the bubble
before the reversal of monetary policy. In addition, an examination of the real 
short-term interest rate might suggest its decline was not sufficient for coping with
the balance-sheet adjustment pressures that became evident later on.
C. Summary of the Tentative Evaluation
Based on the above analysis, we will summarize our very tentative evaluation of 
monetary policy responses after the bursting of the bubble.
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Figure 32  U.S. Short-Term Real Interest Rates1. Evaluation of the monetary policy response
First, in summary, what our analysis above suggests is that: (1) the timing of policy
reversal was swift; (2) with the benefit of hindsight, however, it is possible to argue
that the degree of monetary easing corresponded to an economic setback in an 
ordinary stock adjustment phase, but not necessarily in an extraordinary recession; in
other words, the negative effects of the collapse that later became evident may have
been underestimated at that time.
Some caveats are in order here. Our appraisal depends on some mechanical 
application of simple yardsticks; thus there are limitations in evaluating the 
adequacy of policy decisions based solely on real-time information. Any bubble can
only be identified for certain as a bubble after it has definitely burst. It is close to 
impossible to foresee with any precision in the early stages of the crash the magnitude
of adjustment pressure it will bring forth.
In addition, we have to take into account that public sentiment against the 
asset price bubble, and the desire for “bubble-busting” that then existed, formed 
a social background against which it was difficult to pursue an even more drastic
monetary easing.
30 The BOJ is not, and should not be a dictator. It is a central 
bank in a democracy, which is not able to pursue a policy without some degree of
understanding and support from the general public.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the monetary easing that was implemented in
the aftermath of the bursting of the asset price bubble should, especially if the then
social sentiment prevailing is carefully taken into account, be assessed as broadly 
adequate as a response to the economic setback in a normal stock adjustment cycle.
However, in order to draw lessons for future central banking, we felt it useful to
extract factors that might have been underestimated in the real-time decision-making
process, but, with the aid of hindsight, were of importance in foreseeing the precise
magnitude of the adjustment pressure. We focus in what follows on the negative
effects of balance-sheet adjustment, the magnitude of which seems not to have been 
recognized in its entirety in the early phase of the recession.
2. Delayed recognition of balance-sheet adjustment
In retrospect, it is possible to point out several misperceptions about the mechanism
of balance-sheet adjustment at the time.
First, it was not correctly recognized that “while debts always remain, assets may
become lost.” This was partly because the vast majority of people, including policy
makers, believed, up to a certain point in time, that “asset prices, even if they decline
now, will recover in due course.”
31 Second, it was not correctly understood what kind
of mechanism might be triggered when asset prices decline while the nominal value
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30. For example, the former BOJ Governor Mieno, who took office in December 1989 and proceeded with 
monetary tightening from the start, was named “Heisei’s Oni-Hei” by a well-known critic. Oni-Hei was the
nickname for Heizoh Hasegawa, who was chief of the security police during the 1780s–90s in the Edo Period. 
A gang of thieves in those days was afraid of him, since he enforced crackdowns against them as a devil, or 
oni. This episode clearly indicates that the public felt that “bubble-busting” was a right-minded act even from an
ethical viewpoint. 
31. For example, Nishimura (1999) recollects: “Even the unprecedented land price decline in 1974 subsequent to the
Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago continued for just a year and was limited to 5 percent. When we
observed a sign of land price decline in September 1991, most people believed that land prices would soonof debt is held constant.
32
A possible explanation of this lack of understanding may have been something that
could be called tacit dominance of the “zero-sum fallacy,” i.e., that capital gain and loss
should offset each other, and thus be neutral with regard to economic 
activity as a whole. A capital gain, even if it is unrealized, corresponds to an increase in
net worth. However, once such capital gain has stimulated expenditure—via the
wealth effect on consumption—or has been used for aggressive capital investment with
debt-financing, and these expenditures turn out to be “excessive” ex post, or in plain
words, wasted, the subsequent decline in asset prices will end up as “negative-sum,” not
“zero-sum.” This comes close to what happened in Japan in the last two decades.
It may also not have been well recognized that the adjustment cost of the bursting
of the asset price bubble may increase as the adjustment process is prolonged. Since
the bursting of a bubble occurs as a consequence of the emergence and expansion 
of that bubble beforehand, some kinds of adjustment are inevitable. However, the
policy implications might differ depending on whether one believes that “adjustment
costs are constant” regardless of policy responses, or, instead, supposes that adjust-
ment costs may increase as policy responses are delayed, because nonperforming
assets will pile up due to the deterioration in business conditions. In the latter case,
speed of decision and implementation of policy reactions also matters, even if the
same policy packages are established. 
3. What monetary policy alone cannot do
However, it is difficult to imagine that the outcome would have differed greatly even if
the drastic monetary easing that eventually took place had been decided at an earlier
point in time. Monetary easing alone would not have been able to make things much
better without having devised a fundamental cure for the nonperforming-asset prob-
lem, which was hindering the smooth functioning of financial intermediation, as the
deviation between monetary base and M2+CDs indicates. As described earlier in this
paper, the magnitude of the nonperforming-asset problem in the aftermath of the
bursting of the bubble was unprecedented. If one takes into account the significant role
this problem played in prolonging the stagnation, it seems obvious that there was a limit
to the extent to which monetary policy would have been capable of stimulating the
economy on its own. What the U.S. experience in the early 1990s tells us is that the
disposal of nonperforming assets played a role as important in supporting the economy
as the monetary easing that pushed the real short-term interest rate down to zero.
As we examine in detail in the next chapter, it was considered in Japan that the
cost of pursuing a fundamental cure for the nonperforming-asset problem in a phase
of recession would have been enormous, and, as a result, both the government and
the BOJ decided to implement a series of fiscal and monetary stimulus measures,
which they considered easier to enforce in the short run. In retrospect, one can 
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recover, recollecting their experience of the Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.”
32. In the early 1990s when the credit crunch was a big issue of debate in the United States, it seemed that even the
FRB lagged behind in recognizing the mechanism of balance-sheet adjustment. In fact, although the FRB cut the
interest rate by a quarter percentage point in January 1991, subsequent to the previous cut at end-1990 by a quar-
ter percentage point, the growth rate of bank assets remained at just 1 percent. However, FRB Chairman
Greenspan began to emphasize the impacts of the balance-sheet mechanism in the fall of 1991, by using a metaphor
of “50 mile per hour headwinds.” For the details of the situation at that time, see, for example, Beckner (1996).say that Japan has opted to absorb the impacts of the shock, with the aid of 
macroeconomic policy and prudential policy, over a lengthy period. Any assessment
of this choice, however, has to take carefully into account, first, whether or not it
would have been possible to accelerate the adjustment process, and second, what
were the costs and benefits of prolonging the adjustment phase.
33
V. Prudential Policy Responses
As we indicated at the end of Chapter IV, to understand the background of Japan’s
stagnant economy in the 1990s, it is not enough to consider the monetary policy
responses, but prudential policy also has to be examined. In Japan, prudential policy
has been conducted by the cooperation between the financial supervisory authority
and the BOJ. In this paper, the “financial supervisory authority” mainly refers to the
Ministry of Finance. From June 1998 onward, it refers to the Financial Supervisory
Agency and the Ministry of Finance.
34
A. What Prudential Policy Achieved
The BOJ’s prudential policy has been criticized from various viewpoints. The most
important of such criticisms is that the BOJ is responsible for the huge costs entailed
in resolving the nonperforming-asset problem of financial institutions, because it
chose a buy-time policy, in cooperation with the financial supervisory authority, in
order not to let the problem materialize at an earlier stage.
It should be noted, however, that the BOJ’s ultimate goal in its prudential policy
is to maintain the stability of the financial system. Considering the importance 
of preventing systemic risk in fulfilling this mission, it should be counted as a 
significant achievement that the materialization of systemic risk in the form of a 
contagious bank run (or collapse of the financial system) has been avoided, in spite 
of the lack of a comprehensive safety net and established bankruptcy procedures 
to handle with institutions in trouble. This helped, in conjunction with monetary
easing, to prevent the Japanese economy from being trapped in a serious deflationary
spiral. In assessing prudential policy we should always bear in mind what other 
alternative measure were available, and at what potential cost. 
B. Nonperforming Loans and Prudential Policy
An important issue in discussing the costs incurred by the nonperforming-asset 
problem in Japan is the length of time it took to resolve it.
The fundamental reason why it took a long time to deal with the problem was 
the delay in introducing bankruptcy procedures to be applied to institutions that 
got into trouble, and in constructing a comprehensive safety net that enables prob-
lems to be tackled according to their severity. In fact, for a long time burden-sharing
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33. It should be noted that macroeconomic policy possessed some aspect of “buying time” to hide the gravity of the
nonperforming-asset problem, making it possible for regulatory authorities to gain time.
34. Some financial institutions other than banks, such as credit cooperatives and federational credit associations, are
supervised by the local government or the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.within a financial sector grouping had been virtually the only measure available 
to the authorities for resolving the problems of failed financial institutions (For
details of the incidents that occurred and the measures taken with regard to financial
system stability, please refer to Table 3).
35 A host of factors are offered as having
formed the background to the delay in constructing the bankruptcy procedures and
comprehensive safety net.
36 As we will illustrate in the following sections, various 
factors were intertwined and made the problem complex and difficult to deal with. 
1. Why the settlement of the problems of failed financial institutions was 
prolonged
No matter whether losses incurred by a failed institution are imposed on large 
depositors and investors, or the money of the depositors and investors is totally 
protected by some comprehensive safety net, it is close to impossible to obtain 
public support for closing banks without the disclosure of the whole picture of the
true state of the nonperforming-asset problem and banks’ business conditions. 
On the other hand, given that a huge amount of nonperforming assets already
existed and bankruptcy procedures against troubled institutions and comprehensive
safety net were not established, disclosing information on the problem might have
aroused serious concern over the financial system, and may thus have triggered a 
systemic crisis. Suppose that a bank becomes unable to keep itself alive on its own. In
such a situation, the financial supervisory authority, if it wishes to avoid a systemic
crisis, is left with the sole option of providing the troubled institution with enough
liquidity to buy time. The bought time is used for the bank to make provision
against nonperforming assets with its operational profits and the gains realized from
its securities holdings, or to find someone willing to take over the bank that is in
trouble, with or without public financial support. This comes close to what 
happened in Japan.
During this process, information on the magnitude of the nonperforming-asset
problem and the soundness of individual banks and the banking sector as a whole
was kept within limited circles, including the financial supervisory authority and the
Bank of Japan; disclosure to the public occurred only gradually. Naturally, market
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35. A standard criticism against the way problem banks were dealt with after the bursting of the bubble is typically
indicated in Shimizu and Horiuchi (1997): financial liberalization reduced the “franchise value” of banks (banks’
unreproducible illiquid assets, such as the long-term relationship between banks and their depositors and 
borrowers whose value can be maintained only if they are a going concern) so that the banks could not find an
economically rational incentive to rescue or merge troubled financial institutions but the financial supervisory
authority did not stop relying on burden-sharing among financial institutions. While this view has some 
relevancy, the authors of this paper believe that the underlying reason was the delay in introducing bankruptcy
procedures for troubled institutions and in constructing a comprehensive safety net.
36. For example, Yoshitomi (1998, pp. 136–137) pointed out that there was a kind of implicit consensus among
bank management, the financial supervisory authority and politicians, all of whom had an incentive to shirk their
responsibility, on the postponement of settlement of the nonperforming-loan problem. In other words, bank
management, the financial supervisory authority, and politicians all had an incentive to postpone an injection of
taxpayers’ money into the banking sector, which was a necessary measure for depositor protection as well as for
an early settlement of banking system instability, for fear of being blamed for it: (1) banks’ management would
be blamed for their mismanagement and be requested to restructure; (2) the financial supervisory authority
would be blamed for insufficient monitoring; (3) politicians would be criticized for having used taxpayers’ money
to rescue the banks. There are other points to be criticized, including a conflict of interest within the Ministry 
of Finance between the financial regulatory function and the government budgeting and taxing authority 
that are both the responsibility of that one ministry, and the government’s underestimation of the increase in 
nonperforming loans that had occurred due to the non-repayment of interest on existing loans.94 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001
Table 3  Chronology of Events That Affected the Stability of the Financial System
Year Month Main events
1971 July The Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) was established under the provisions of the
Deposit Insurance Law (DIL, brought into effect in April 1971).
1986 July The DIL was amended to include “financial assistance.”
1992 April The DIC extended financial assistance (loans) for the first time to Iyo Bank in order to 
facilitate its merger with the failed Toho Sogo Bank.
October Financial assistance (in the form of grants) was provided for the first time to Sanwa Bank 
in order to facilitate its acquisition of the failed Toyo Shinkin Bank.
1994 December The Tokyo Metropolitan Government announced the resolution plan of Tokyo Kyowa and
Anzen Credit Cooperatives.
1995 January Tokyo Kyodo Bank was established to take over the assets and liabilities of the Tokyo 
Kyowa and Anzen Credit Cooperatives.
June The Ministry of Finance issued a report entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial
System.” (The report disclosed that the estimated outstanding of nonperforming loans 
[the total of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, past due loans, and restructured loans]
of the deposit-taking financial institutions at the end of March 1995 was about ¥40 trillion.)
The three ruling coalition parties (Liberal Democratic, Social Democratic, and Sakigake) set
up a joint task force that aimed at resolving the nonperforming loan problem of the jusen
(housing loan companies).
July The Tokyo Metropolitan Government ordered Cosmo Credit Cooperative to suspend its 
business, except for the repayment of deposits.
August The Osaka Prefectural Government ordered Kizu Credit Cooperative to suspend its business,
except for repayment of deposits.
Hyogo Bank was liquidated: its assets (except for nonperforming loans) and liabilities were
transferred to Midori Bank, which was newly founded by shareholder banks and local firms
and received grants from the DIC.
September Daiwa Bank was discovered to have covered up the loss of nearly US$1.1 billion incurred 
by a rogue trader at the New York branch.
November Daiwa Bank accepted the New York state government’s order to close down its operations 
in the United States. (Most of its operations were assumed by Sumitomo Bank.)
December The Cabinet decided on concrete measures to address the jusen problem.
The Financial System Research Council released its recommendations on “Measures for
Stabilization of the Financial System.”
1996 June The Diet passed six laws promoting stability of the financial system: the Jusen Law (the 
Law Concerning Special Packages for Promoting Disposal of Claims and Debts of Specified
Housing Loan Companies); the Law Concerning Special Packages for Suspending the
Prescription of Claims Owned by the Specified Jusen; the Law to Amend the Deposit
Insurance Law; the Special Law Concerning the Reorganization of Financial Institutions; the
Law to Implement Measures for Ensuring the Sound Management of Financial Institutions;
and the Law to Amend the Agricultural and Fishery Cooperative Savings Insurance Law.
Special financial assistance was introduced as a temporary measure to protect all the 
depositors of the failed banks until the end of March 2001.
The regulations concerning the Resolutions and Collection Bank were provided.
The Ministry of Finance decided to introduce the Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998.
The general premium rate of the deposit insurance was raised from 0.012 percent to 
0.048 percent (of the total balance of all deposits), and the special insurance premium
(0.036 percent) was temporarily introduced.
July The Housing Loan Administration Corporation was established.
September Tokyo Kyodo Bank was restructured into the Resolution and Collection Bank. 
An incorporated association, the New Financial Stabilization Fund, was established.
November The Ministry of Finance ordered Hanwa Bank to suspend its business, except for the 
repayment of deposits.
Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a deregulation package for reforming the Japanese
financial system, the so-called Japanese “Big Bang.”95
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Year Month Main events
1997 April A restructuring plan for Nippon Credit Bank was announced: it included (1) the purchase 
of newly issued shares by its shareholder banks, (2) a swap of its subordinated debentures
held by insurance companies for shares, and (3) underwriting of preferred stocks by the
New Financial Stabilization Fund.
July The government published a detailed plan of the Japanese “Big Bang.”
November Sanyo Securities filed for corporate reorganization under the Corporate Reorganization 
Law; a default of call loans occurred for the first time since World War II.
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed; Yamaichi Securities announced that it was to close down
voluntarily; Tokuyo City Bank failed.
December The DIL was revised to allow the DIC to provide financial assistance to (1) a merger that
does not involve failed financial institutions and (2) a consolidation between two or more
failed financial institutions.
1998 February A Law to Amend the DIL was enacted to provide public funds totaling ¥17 trillion to the 
DIC for the resolution of the problems of financial institutions in difficulties. The Law
Concerning Emergency Measures for Financial Stabilization was enacted; the Financial 
Crisis Management Examination Board was established within the DIC. Public funds worth
¥30 trillion in total were appropriated for financial system stabilization.
March The Financial Crisis Management Examination Board approved the injection of a total of 
¥1.8 trillion of public funds to recapitalize 21 banks by purchasing preferred stocks and 
subordinated debentures.
The Land Revaluation Law was enacted. (This temporary legislation was valid only for 
fiscal 1998 and 1999.)
April The Prompt Corrective Action was implemented.
The new Bank of Japan Law and the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law came into force.
June Four laws implementing the Japanese “Big Bang” were approved by the Diet.
The Financial Supervisory Agency was established.
July The Government and ruling coalition parties published “The Total Plan of Financial
Reconstruction.”
October Enactment of the financial reconstruction legislation: the Law on Emergency Measures for
Stabilizing the Financial Function; the Financial Functioning Early Strengthening Law; the
Law to Amend the DIL; the Servicer Law; Two laws simplifying public auction procedures;
the Law concerning temporary measures to facilitate the transfer of assets backed by 
revolving collateral.
A special public administration scheme was introduced; the outstanding total of public funds
appropriated for the purpose of financial system stabilization was increased to ¥60 trillion.
The Financial Crisis Management Examination Board was abolished.
Long-Term Credit Bank was placed under special public administration under the terms of
the Financial Reconstruction Law.
December Nippon Credit Bank was placed under special public administration under the terms of the
Financial Reconstruction Law.
The Financial Reconstruction Commission was established.
1999 January The guidelines for the work of the Financial Reconstruction Commission were approved.
March The Financial Reconstruction Commission approved the injection of public funds (about 
¥7.5 trillion in total) into 15 major banks to reinforce their capital positions.
September The Financial Reconstruction Commission approved the injection of public funds 
(¥2.6 billion in total) into four regional banks to reinforce their capital positions.
December The three ruling coalition parties agreed to postpone the termination of special financial
assistance until the end of March 2002. (It was originally due to cease at the end of 
March 2001.)
Finance Minister Miyazawa publicly stated that the total amount of public funds 
appropriated for financial system stabilization would be raised to ¥70 trillion.
Sources: Nishimura (1999); Japanese Bankers Association, Kin’yu (Finance); Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Annual Report; Bank of Japan, Annual Report.discipline could not work effectively in that situation. Even a bank on the verge of
bankruptcy would not come under the pressure of market forces, such as a drastic
decline in its stock price or a downgrading of its credit worthiness, or difficulty in
meeting its funding needs. Since financial institutions were able to maintain their
operations as far as they were managing to meet their funding needs, what was then
predominant was something like a state of fallacious stability. Without sufficient
information, there existed no strong criticism of this situation.
This fallacious state of stability made it possible to prevent systemic crisis. At 
the same time, however, it considerably weakened the momentum needed for 
establishing bankruptcy procedures for institutions in trouble and for constructing 
a comprehensive safety net. It was the very success of buying time that forced 
the authorities to buy more time, and thus the whole process of handling the 
nonperforming-asset problem was prolonged.
37
2. The buy time policy and the dominating view regarding economic recovery
and the development of asset prices
A natural and legitimate criticism that arises here is that the financial supervisory
authority should have organized the framework required for coping with the problem
much earlier. The reality was that up to a certain point both the financial supervisory
authority and management of financial institutions seemed to have expected the
economy and land prices to recover before long. If that were the case, the non-
performing-asset problem would have been fixed without any special treatment. In
particular, land price was the key element that decided the volume of nonperforming
assets, since small and medium-sized enterprises and non-bank financial institutions
had heavily invested in real estate with the money borrowed from banks during the
speculative bubble years.
To be fair, it should be pointed out here that the authorities and the bankers were
not alone in expecting an early recovery in economic activity and asset prices. In fact,
their expectation was broadly shared in the early phase of asset deflation.
38 The “myth
of ever-rising land prices,” which had dominated the bubble economy, survived in
the sense that for a fairly long time after the bursting of the bubble it was still widely
believed that land prices would recover once the necessary adjustment phase was over. 
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37. Of course, the financial assistance function of the DIC, which was introduced when the Deposit Insurance Law
(DIL) was revised in July 1986, could have been implemented, and it was actually applied when the troubled
Toho Sogo Bank was merged with Iyo Bank in 1992. However, financial assistance was conditional on the
merger and on the passing of a special resolution at the shareholders’ meetings of both the closing bank and the
assuming bank, so a lack of flexibility restricted implementation of this function. Because of this limitation, it
could only be used as a component of the total package that was agreed by the banks that assist or rescue the 
failing bank, or involved loss-sharing within the industry. In particular, the DIC’s financial assistance function
was restricted to situations in which the bridge bank was available and its assistance was limited to the payoff
cost, both of which seemed to be definitive limitations restricting the implementation of this function. The DIL
was amended in June 1996 to enable the DIC to extend financial assistance to cases that involved sums that
exceeded payoff costs; in order to finance the additional cost, the deposit insurance premium was increased. At
the same time, the framework of depositors’ protection afforded by public funds was also introduced, but only
for cases of failure of credit cooperatives. However, the depositor protection framework that dealt with failed
banks still faced limitations such as the DIC’s weak financial condition and the continuing lack of bankruptcy
procedures for banks.
38. In the preface to the White Paper on the development of the Japanese economy in the fiscal year 1991 (published
in July 1992), it was said that the impact of bursting of the bubble economy was not so great, so the economy
would recover in the latter half of 1992 because of the restructuring of the enterprises and accommodative 
economic policies.3. Costs and benefits of the buy-time policy
When it became quite clear that the expectation of recovery in land prices was a 
fallacy, the main purpose of the buy-time policy changed. Its aim was now to secure
enough time for bringing realistic bankruptcy procedures to be applied to troubled
financial institutions into law and establishing a reasonably comprehensive safety net.
In retrospect, these goals were not realized until after the collapse of some major
financial institutions had brought us to the brink of a systemic crisis.
39
How should we interpret this sober fact? It is possible to argue that some broad
public consensus needed for establishing a comprehensive safety including the 
injection of public funds into financial institutions would never have been attained
without a quasi-crisis such as the one that actually occurred after the collapse of
major financial institutions. If one inclines to this view, the conclusion is that the
benefit of buying time was rather limited. 
However, it is also possible to present an alternative interpretation. The financial
supervisory authority and the BOJ, while adopting a buy-time policy, had liquidated
a number of failed financial institutions, albeit mostly relatively small ones, without
causing a systemic crisis. The experience they accumulated in this process helped
them considerably in containing the financial turmoil that erupted in the aftermath
of the failure of major institutions to the limited proportions of a quasi-crisis, and
prevented its deterioration into a real crisis. 
It is obviously premature at this point to side definitely with either of these two
views, and aver whether there was any benefit in buying time or not. 
What about the cost of buying time? In a narrow sense, this can be measured as
the increase in the costs entailed in dealing with the nonperforming-asset problem. In
order to tackle this aspect, we have to explore how, for example, land prices would
have moved if the nonperforming-asset problem had been settled and the financial
intermediation function revitalized earlier.
40 Such an exploration is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The cost, in a broader sense, is the negative impact of the nonperforming-asset
problem on the economy. It could hardly be possible to deny that this cost had any
significant effect, since it is quite obvious that the delay in revitalizing the financial
intermediary function hampered recovery of the economy. 
However, here we are faced again with a legitimate counter-argument. How
would that cost compare with the damage a systemic crisis, the realization of which
was circumvented in the end, might have caused? We have to confess that weighing
the balance between the cost of delay in economic recovery and the cost of meltdown
of the financial system is far beyond the ability of the authors of this paper, at least
for the time being. 
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39. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997) claimed that the first turning point away from the buy-time policy was the
resolution of the problems of Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen Credit Cooperatives in December 1994, which involved
the establishment of Tokyo Kyodo Bank. Supposing that this is the case, it means that it still required three more
years to realize a fundamental change in prudential policy, namely the injection of the taxpayers’ money into the
banking industry, and it was decided after collapse of the major financial institutions.
40. If an early settlement could have prevented the increase in nonperforming assets caused by worsening financial
and business conditions of the debtors, and thus have limited the continuous decline in land prices, then that
would imply that the costs in a narrow sense incurred by the buy-time policy were quite high.4. The Bank of Japan and the buy-time policy
As regards the buy-time policy, the BOJ has been faced with the strong criticism that
the bank had more information on the business conditions of financial institutions
than the financial supervisory authority and should therefore have sent cautionary
messages regarding the severity of the banks’ nonperforming-loan problem at an early
stage, even though the financial supervisory authority hesitated to do so.
41
If the central bank had made public its own judgment prior to the supervisory
authority, it would have caused some temporary friction but may have contributed to
an earlier establishment of the necessary framework. In fact, Governor Hayami’s
warning in October 1998 that the capital ratios of 19 major Japanese banks were as
low as the danger level actually contributed to the decision to inject public money
into the banks under the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law.
42
However, this is a rather delicate matter. It is also possible that this kind of warning
from a central bank might have aroused excessive fear in the financial markets, and
caused a panic reaction similar to that which was observed on Black Monday in October
1987, or even worse, have triggered a series of bank runs. In the aforementioned episode,
Governor Hayami was taking a risk, quite legitimately, in order to urge an early capital
injection to ensure the revitalization of the financial intermediation system; but he was
heavily criticized that time. Panic in the financial system has a self-fulfilling nature. Even
though warnings by the central bank are meant to accelerate the restoration of sound-
ness of the financial system, there is always a considerable risk that it might make it 
difficult to avoid systemic risk, once the message is taken inappropriately. Should 
this fear materialize, the stakes are enormously high, especially if the safety net is not
comprehensive enough to deal with imminent problems. 
The inaction the BOJ chose could be interpreted to mean that it did not seek for
a “best outcome if successful, however with high risk,” but opted for a solution which
could achieve only a “sub-optimal outcome but with relatively low risk.”
43 In other
words, the BOJ had judged that the potential systemic-risk damage would outweigh
the costs entailed by delayed economic recovery under the buy-time policy. 
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41. For example, see Yamawaki (1998).
42. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (morning newspaper on October 6, 1998) article quoted an article in the New York
Times (daily newspaper on October 5, 1998), in which it was said that Governor Hayami of the BOJ 
participated in an unofficial meeting between Finance Minister Miyazawa and Treasury Secretary Rubin (Fed
Chairman Greenspan also took part in the meeting) prior to the G-7 official meeting held in Washington, D.C.,
in early October 1998, and that Governor Hayami explained that “the capital ratios of 19 major Japanese banks
were as low as the danger level.” Since this article led to a widening of the Japan premium in the Eurodollar 
market and temporarily made the Japanese banks’ foreign currency funding difficult, Governor Hayami was 
criticized: for instance, the chairman of the Japanese Bankers Association said, “The Governor made a imprudent
comment, even though it is true.” In response to this criticism, Governor Hayami answered in the Diet session of
October 7 that it was a misleading quotation based on a misunderstanding. He also explained that his comment
on the banks’ capital accounts was misunderstood as a comment on their capital ratios. Later, in the Governor’s
regular press conference of October 15, he reflected on the bill of Financial Function Early Strengthening 
Law drafted by the Liberal Democratic Party, which provided capital injection scheme of public funds, and 
said, “None of the banks is sufficiently capitalized. Hence, I wish the banks altogether would give a positive
response to the scheme and apply for the scheme given by the Government that appropriates public funds for
strengthening the banks’ capital accounts.”
43. In the meantime, the BOJ took extraordinary measures for a central bank, including the provision of 
money involving credit risk similar to the capital supplied for the resolution of the problems of financial 
institutions. These measures later resulted in the imposition of losses on the BOJ, which is a point which should
be considered in assessing the BOJ’s policy response. One possible assessment is that this was inevitable for theVI. Lessons
This section is a very preliminary attempt to evaluate the BOJ’s monetary and 
prudential policies in the aftermath of the collapse of the bubble economy, and draw
some lessons for future monetary and prudential policies.
The timing of policy reversal toward monetary easing was relatively swift,
although the magnitude of initial easing was enough to offset a standard recession,
not an extraordinary post-bubble recession. The following accommodative monetary
policy was historically unprecedented, and succeeded in avoiding the kind of 
deflationary spiral that occurred in the United States in the 1930s.
44 However, 
when we review the post-bubble period as a whole, it is also true that the process 
of recovery in business conditions was still far from being satisfactory. It has taken 
a long time to dispose of the overhang of debt in the nonfinancial sector, which is 
the other side of the same coin of the accumulation of nonperforming assets in the
financial sector.
So what lessons can be learned? The first is that a central bank should, with great
caution, recognize the importance of various pressures which tend to amplify 
ordinary business-cycle movements. And when it does recognize some significant
extraordinary pressures it should flexibly consider the need for additional action to
mitigate them. Taking account of the fact that the nonperforming-asset problem 
hindered the smooth functioning of the financial intermediation system and thus
prolonged economic stagnation, an even more accommodative stance might have
been put into effect if we had been more confident earlier about the macroeconomic
implication of this problem.
Monetary easing of this nature can be characterized as a policy designed to “buy
time,” that is, to buy time until the structural policy bears fruit. In fact, when it 
lowered the official discount rate to 0.5 percent in September 1995, the Policy Board
issued a statement stressing that such monetary easing would only be effective if 
it were accompanied by structural policies such as deregulation. It can not be 
emphasized too much that monetary policy may succeed in buying time for the 
necessary adjustments, but it cannot substitute for structural reform itself. 
By easing monetary conditions aggressively and playing the role as lender of last
resort to support the financial system in a decisive manner, the BOJ no doubt averted
both deflation and financial panic, but at the cost of dampening the restructuring
efforts of Japanese corporations and financial institutions. The fact that it did not
take leading actions to disclose to the public the problems of the financial sector in
its entirety contributed to insufficient support for legislative initiatives and budget
outlays in response to bank failures. Moreover, mitigating immediate risks reduced
incentives on the part of regulatory authority to adopt ultimate solutions. The BOJ
was faced with an enormous dilemma. 
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BOJ in fulfilling its mission of avoiding materialization of systemic risk, given that bankruptcy procedures to deal
with troubled institutions and a comprehensive safety net did not exist. Another claim is that the BOJ should
have tried to make such a warning as mentioned above before it had been forced to respond by providing its
money. This ends up with the question of how far the BOJ could commit itself to take risks when facing the 
possibility of materialization of the system risk.
44. Okina (1999) and McKinnon (1999) are based on this viewpoint.In this regard, the second possible lesson concerns the importance of how the cen-
tral bank should address such structural problems. In fact, most of the structural prob-
lems are “predetermined” for the central bank in the short run, as are nonperforming
loan and government debt problems. However, from a somewhat longer perspective, it
may be possible for a central bank to take some meaningful initiatives and to work on
the parties concerned. It seems to be conducive for the central bank to participate more
actively in the process of designing economic systems and working on the allocation of
policy instruments to improve the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy as a whole.
45
Take prudential policy, for example. Kane (1993) points out that the basic princi-
ples to minimize the cost of buying time for regulatory authority are as follows. First,
to improve incentives for the regulatory authority, the consequences of regulatory
choice must be made transparent enough for outsiders to monitor. Second, to this
end, it is necessary to limit the responsibilities of the regulatory authority to monitor-
ing and minimizing the systemic risk spread over the financial system as a whole.
46
Two issues emerge immediately from these arguments. First, an attempt should be
made to make more efficient use of the disciplinary effect that market pressure 
provides in containing the excessive risk-taking behavior of financial institutions, and
to design an incentive-compatible system to complement this market discipline.
47
Second, once the present exceptional state is overcome—i.e., when exceptional 
measures including the full guarantee of all the depositors at the expense of 
public funds become unnecessary—the public safety net should seek to minimize 
the coverage as long as systemic risk can be avoided.
48
An immediate issue is how to evaluate the government decision to postpone the
start of “payoff” for one year, i.e., from April 2001 to 2002. Is that really necessary
now that a quite comprehensive safety net has been provided, and there is growing
understanding among the general public about the gravity of and nature of the 
nonperforming-asset problem? Since it will take some more time before the non-
performing-asset problem is fully solved, we should intensify positive discussion on
how to restore the health of financial system as early as possible.
Japan’s experience in the 1990s underlines the importance for the BOJ of partic-
ipating actively in addressing structural problems, and of seeking better and more
prompt understanding of the effects of shocks, including structural ones, on the economy.
The authors hope that this paper has made some contribution in fostering such efforts.
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45. For the discussion on monetary policy and structural problems, see Yamaguchi (1999) and Shirakawa (2000).
46. In Japan, as Fukao (1998) pointed out, procedures in financial accounting employ the acquisition cost method,
lagging to introduce market value information into financial reporting and leading to an insufficient disclosure 
of management information. In addition, cross-shareholding between corporations and banks limit the cost of
capital, dampening incentives for managers to improve efficiency in corporate management. This led to a lack of
corporate governance mechanism through capital markets, forming one of the factors that provoked instability in
the financial system.
47. For example, if we narrow the extent of coverage of the safety net, creditors other than small-scale depositors 
covered by the deposit insurance would have to share risks of bank failure, promoting incentives to monitor bank
management. In this context, it is very important to consider the expansion of disclosure by banks themselves
and the proper conduct of prompt corrective action.
48. Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998), which comprehensively surveys the recent development of theoretical and
empirical literature, points out the pros and cons of a public safety net as follows. On the one hand, the fragility
inherent in the banking system as a liquidity provider requires a public safety net such as government deposit 
insurance and a central bank’s lender of last resort function. On the other hand, however, such a public safety net
has numerous costs in terms of the distortion of the asset portfolio choices of banks, lowering their efficiency.Bank of Japan, Bank Examination and Surveillance Department, “Profits and Balance-Sheet
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Naruki Mori, Shigenori Shiratsuka, and Hiroo Taguchi submit a comprehensive and
illuminating paper on the difficult and painful post-bubble adjustments in the
Japanese economy. They examine the role of monetary policy and prudential 
supervision after the bursting of the bubble in order to assess the performance of 
the authorities in dealing with the economic problems of the 1990s. They reach two
sets of conclusions:
(1) Some critics argue that the Bank of Japan was too slow in relaxing monetary
policy and therefore contributed to prolonging the economic crisis. According
to the authors of the paper, with hindsight, the critics may have a point. In the
mid-1990s, the Bank faced a complicated situation. The slump in economic
activity starting in 1991 at first looked like a normal cyclical contraction. The
policy course pursued by the Bank would have been adequate if the contraction
had indeed been normal. However, only as time wore on did it become obvious
that the recession was abnormal and thus required a more expansionary course
than the Bank would have followed in ordinary circumstances.
(2) Prudential supervisors too are criticized for their slow reaction. The authors
argue that the authorities had been aware for a long time of the precarious
state of the Japanese banking system. Even so, they were reluctant to take swift
action because the Japanese financial system lacked a safety net and adequate
bankruptcy procedures. In these circumstances, swift action might have pro-
voked a systemic crisis. Therefore, the authorities tried to gain sufficient time
to implement the institutional changes required to deal effectively with the
banks’ problem of nonperforming loans. In this way, the authorities could
avert a systemic crisis, but at the cost of worsening the nonperforming-loan
problem. The authors are very careful in passing judgment on the supervisors’
performance. They seem to hint that their performance was not optimal.
Since I cannot claim to be an expert on Japanese monetary and supervisory 
policies, I do not wish to comment on the specifics of the authors’ paper. On the
whole, I find their analysis persuasive although I would have liked to see more
explicit conclusions regarding the performance of supervisors. I only quibble about
two issues raised in the paper.
First, the authors employ a variety of indicators in order to judge whether monetary
policy was adequate in the face of the Japanese recession. What is the significance of
these indicators? Does the Bank actually monitor them? Did these indicators in the
mid-1990s convince the Bank that it faced an extraordinary situation, or were other
considerations relevant? It would be interesting to learn more about how the Bank
actually made policy decisions in a very difficult economic environment. Moreover,
the question arises whether the indicators used by the authors could also serve as 
reliable guides to monetary policy in the future.
Second, there is a troubling aspect about the authors’ analysis of prudential 
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Commentpolicies. As I already pointed out, the authors argue that the authorities knew about
the nonperforming-loan problem at an early stage, but concealed from the public the
dismal state of Japanese banks in order to buy time. But could the authorities really
withhold such information for a lengthy period of time? Our own experience was
entirely different. When a Swiss bank was in trouble, market participants usually
found out quickly. In these circumstances, concealing information was pointless.
Swiss authorities could not help acting quickly in order to avert disaster.
Let me conclude my comment with a point not directly related to the paper.
During the 1990s, Switzerland went through an experience very similar to that of
Japan. A significant slump in real growth in the early 1990s was followed by a long
period of stagnation, opening up the specter of deflation (Figures 1 and 2). Moreover,
in both countries, a banking crisis occurred, due to a bubble in real estate prices 




























Figure 2  Consumer Price Inflationthat had burst at the beginning of the 1990s. In Switzerland the economy started to
take off again in the winter of 1996–97, with the recovery interrupted by the Asian 
crisis. While the Japanese economy also tended to stagnate, Figure 1 shows that real
growth was more volatile than in Switzerland. Japan faced a succession of positive 
and negative economic shocks, emanating, respectively, from the various Japanese 
fiscal packages and the Asian crisis. But contrary to the situation in Switzerland, 
there is still no clear evidence of the Japanese economy having returned to a 
sustained expansion path. How can the differences between the Japanese and Swiss 
economic experiences after 1996–97 be explained? Let us take a look at monetary
and prudential policies in the two countries. 
In my view, monetary policy does not account for the sluggish recovery in Japan
as compared to that in Switzerland. Figure 3 points to striking similarities in the
behavior of the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank. After both central 
banks had relaxed monetary policy early in the 1990s, their enthusiasm for further
loosening waned temporarily in 1994, despite a threat of deflation caused by a sharp
real appreciation of the domestic currency in both countries (Figure 4). As may be
seen from Figure 3, both the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank lowered
interest rates as the economies slumped, but that decline came to a temporary 
halt in 1994. With hindsight, the monetary policy pursued by the Swiss National
Bank in 1994 was clearly inappropriate. The decision against relaxing monetary 
policy probably accentuated the real appreciation of the Swiss franc and delayed 
to some extent the recovery of the Swiss economy.
49 Nevertheless, after a further 
reduction in short-term interest rates in 1995 and 1996, Swiss economic activity



















Figure 3  Three-Month Rate of Interest
49. The growth in the monetary base, then the Swiss National Bank’s intermediate target variable, strongly indicated
that monetary policy was too restrictive in 1994. However, key bank officials misinterpreted the temporary surge
in real growth in 1994 (Figure 1) as a sustained recovery. Moreover, they were concerned about the effects of the
introduction of a value-added tax at the beginning of 1995, which caused inflation to increase temporarily in that
year (Figure 2).continued even though the central bank operated in a similar fashion as the Swiss
National Bank. 
Prudential policies are more likely to explain the differences in Japanese and Swiss
experiences than monetary policies. The nonperforming-loan problem that emerged
in Switzerland in 1991 assumed similar proportions as in Japan. According to the
Federal Banking Commission, the agency in charge of Swiss bank supervision, the
cumulative value of loans written off by Swiss banks after 1992, including provisions
against nonperforming loans still on their books, amounts to roughly 15 percent of
GDP. Despite an enormous nonperforming-loan problem, Switzerland did not face a
banking crisis. Nor can it be argued that the nonperforming-loan problem acted 
as a serious drag on the domestic economy, although many small and medium-sized 
companies complained about banks introducing more stringent standards for assessing
credit risk. Figure 5 compares the development of bank loans in Japan and Switzerland.
As in the case of interest rates, Japanese and Swiss bank loans have moved in an 
amazingly parallel manner. In both countries, bank lending has not grown much since
1993. Yet, despite the sluggish behavior of bank lending, the Swiss economy turned
around strongly, while the prospect of a recovery in the Japanese economy is still 
somewhat uncertain. Thus, I doubt that bank lending acts as a serious impediment to
an economic recovery in the two countries. 
Despite the similarities in lending behavior, there were fundamental differences in
the way the authorities in the two countries reacted to the banking problems of the
1990s. Four differences are particularly worthy of note:
(1) Swiss authorities deregulated the financial sector in the 1980s, long before the
banking crisis broke out. Therefore, banks had ample time to adapt to a new
environment characterized by more vigorous competition among financial
institutions. In Japan, by contrast, the authorities faced the difficult task of
having to deregulate the financial sector at a time when many banks were
already in trouble. 
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Figure 4  Real Effective Exchange Rate(2)  Swiss supervisors acted swiftly when serious problems with nonperforming
loans started to crop up in the course of 1991. They insisted that banks failing
to meet capital requirements should be closed unless they were able to make
up for the deficiency quickly. In contrast to their Japanese counterparts, they
never considered the possibility of implementing a “buy time” policy. 
(3) In their efforts to follow a tough approach to dealing with nonperforming
loans, Swiss supervisors were helped by the fact that—on the whole—domestic
banks, notably most of the big institutions, possessed ample capital and
reserves. Although supervisors closed many small, and even some medium-sized
and big institutions, only few outright bank failures occurred. Most of the 
problem banks were taken over by, or merged with, institutions that were still
equipped with sufficient capital. Even though Switzerland does not feature 
an effective deposit-insurance system, losses by depositors were small. But 
the losses that did occur received a great deal of publicity. As in Japan, the lack 
of an adequate safety net complicated the supervisors’ task of dealing with 
nonperforming loans. 
(4)  Swiss supervisors also benefited from a revolution in corporate governance 
that swept Switzerland in the 1990s and forced financial and nonfinancial 
companies to improve their efficiency. In general, shareholders, like supervisors,
favored a rapid resolution of the nonperforming-loan problem. 
While I find it difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from Japanese and Swiss
experiences with nonperforming loans, it is probably safe to argue that policies of
buying time do not help in resolving banking crises. Swift action by supervisors is
preferable as it helps to contain banking crises and, thus, to minimize the detrimental

















Figure 5  Bank Loans to Customers (Public and Private)Comment
CHARLES COLLYNS
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The paper provides an insightful and thought-provoking review of the policy
responses to the collapse of the asset price bubble.
The paper’s assessment of economic developments in Japan during the 1990s is
very much in line with our own work in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
In particular, our empirical work supports the diagnosis that the prolonged weakness
of Japan’s economy during the 1990s reflected in substantial part the fallout from the
bursting of the asset price bubble. (See, for example, Morsink and Bayoumi [2000].)
Corporations left with excessive debt and capital stock have had to go through a
lengthy period of adjustment that is still not complete. Moreover, a weak financial
system has not been in condition to fulfill its normal intermediation function or, 
perhaps even more important, to apply appropriate market discipline on borrowers. 
I would also agree with the suggestion that, in retrospect, the structure of Japan’s
economy—which looked so strong at the end of the 1980s—has not adapted 
sufficiently quickly to the technological and demographic challenges emerging in 
the 1990s.
With this background, the authors are right to suggest that there were limits to
how far expansionary macroeconomic policies could operate to support economic
activity. Nevertheless, there are valid questions as to whether in fact monetary policy
did do all that it could during this period, and the authors provide some interesting
evidence. I agree with the paper’s tentative conclusion that, with the advantage of
hindsight, the degree of monetary easing may have been adequate for an ordinary
cycle, but was not necessarily either quick or deep enough for the extraordinary and
extended recession which took place after the collapse of the bubble.
(1) Although interest rates were cut sharply in the early 1990s, real short-term call
rates were not in fact reduced significantly below historical averages until the
latter part of 1995. Moreover, real short-term rates were still positive even 
during 1997–98, when Japan suffered the deepest recession experienced by
any major industrial country in the postwar period.
(2) I would draw a similar conclusion from the illustrative Taylor rule calculations
shown in Figure 29 of the paper. The Taylor rule reaction function giving 
significant weight to the output gap (the upper panel of Figure 29) suggests that
short-term rates should in fact have been cut further and faster over 1994–95,
and by an additional six percentage points from 1997 to the end of 1999. 
(3) A third piece of evidence not considered in the paper comes from the 
monetary conditions index (MCI), which is constructed to reflect the impact
of the combination of interest rates and the exchange rate on aggregate
demand. The IMF’s calculations suggest that the MCI rose rather sharply in
1994–95 as the exchange rate appreciated (Figure 1). Moreover, movements of
the MCI imply a considerable tightening of monetary conditions since the
introduction of the zero interest rate policy in February 1999.
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had room to cut overnight rates by about 50 basis points before hitting the zero
interest rate floor, scope that was eventually utilized in February 1999. This raises
two issues:
(1) First, did the BOJ in fact have additional instruments to provide stimulus to
the economy? This question is difficult and will be considered in more detail
in other sessions later in the conference. The IMF’s view is that the BOJ does
have a variety of tools at its disposal—including extending operations up the
yield curve in the government securities market, and unsterilized intervention
in the foreign exchange market. To be sure, the impact of such policies may 
be quantitatively uncertain, and each has its drawbacks, but at some point 
a central bank has to be ready to use all means at its disposal to avoid a 
deflationary situation.
(2) Second, there is also a relevant question of what should be the BOJ’s inflation
objective. The paper notes that while virtually all price indices have shown
mild declines the BOJ did in fact succeed in avoiding a deflationary spiral.
However, I would suggest that Japan’s recent experience provides strong 
support for the proposition that central banks should aim at an inflation rate
that is low but definitely positive. Irrespective of the issue of whether price
indices provide an unbiased indicator of inflation, a positive inflation rate 
provides room for short-term interest rates to be negative in real terms in a
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Figure 1  Japan: Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)steep deflationary spiral, I would argue that in fact macroeconomic outcomes
would have been better if monetary policy had aimed at low but positive 
rates of inflation, as do other countries that have explicitly adopted inflation
targeting frameworks. This is an important lesson that could usefully be
applied now as the BOJ considers its policies looking ahead.
Finally, before turning to prudential policy, let me mention an issue raised in the
papers’ concluding remarks. The authors observe that an easy monetary policy had a
cost of dampening restructuring efforts of corporations and financial institutions.
Should this be an argument in setting the stance of monetary policy? In my 
view, monetary policy should in fact remain focused on macroeconomic outcomes,
while regulatory and structural policies should bear responsibility for ensuring an
appropriate pace of restructuring.
This brings us to the second interesting and difficult issue tackled by this paper,
which relates to whether prudential policy was sufficiently forceful in requiring 
financial institutions to face their weaknesses after the asset price bubble collapse.
Here, the paper identifies a trade-off between the immediate objective of avoiding 
a systemic crisis that could have erupted if the full extent of the banking problem 
had emerged before the necessary instruments to handle resolution of problem 
banks were in place and the longer-term objective of restoring a healthy banking 
system. The authors make the interesting point that the authorities’ very success 
in preventing the full scale of the problem from coming to light at an early stage
probably delayed the political process of putting in place the needed framework for
bank resolution. 
The IMF’s view is that while some regulatory forbearance was probably justified
by the uncertain situation in the early 1990s, the authorities waited for too long to
act forcefully to resolve the very serious weaknesses in the banking system. The costs
of prolonged forbearance should not be underestimated:
(1) First, and most important, a weak banking system applied a serious drag 
on economic performance. As mentioned earlier, this relates to both the 
constraints on financial intermediation and the fact that banks were not in a
position to play their role in corporate governance.
(2) Second, the ultimate fiscal cost of resolution has probably been raised by
allowing banks to continue to increase their exposure to problem debtors. It is
striking that the sectors of the economy which continued to receive credit
during the so-called credit crunch in 1997–98 were the troubled property and
construction sectors.
(3) Third, the prolonged period in which regulatory authorities downplayed
banking problems despite very real market concerns has undercut the credi-
bility of bank regulators. Certainly as early as 1993, strong concerns had
already emerged among market participants about the health of the Japanese
banking system, which were echoed in the IMF’s capital markets reports at the
time (Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau [1993]). There has undoubtedly been a
major shift to tighten bank regulations and supervision since the creation of
what is now the Financial Services Agency, but I think it is fair to say that
credibility has not been fully restored.
110 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001Goldstein, Morris, and David Folkerts-Landau, International Capital Markets Part II, Systemic Issues 
in International Finance, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, August 1993.
Morsink, James, and Tamim Bayoumi, “Monetary Policy Transmission in Japan,” in Tamim Bayoumi
and Charles Collyns, eds. Post-Bubble Blues: How Japan Responded to Asset Price Collapse,




Against this, the paper points out that the “buy time” policy avoided an early 
systemic meltdown and gave regulators experience in dealing with small failures,
before large failures occurred in 1997. However, I do not share the view that the
choice was truly between forbearance and a systemic crisis. Japan’s experience can be
compared to that of the Nordic countries, which also went through an asset price
bubble and collapse in the late 1980s, creating a banking crisis. These countries
embraced transparency and resolved their banking problems much more quickly in
the 1990s. As a result, these countries’ economies were able to turn around much
more quickly than Japan.
General Discussion
Responding to the comments by Charles Collyns and Georg Rich, Shigenori
Shiratsuka argued that it is not clear how effective a quicker and larger monetary 
easing would have been in dealing with the nonperforming-loan problem in the
banking sector that remained unresolved throughout the 1990s. It is also incon-
ceivable to him that inflation targeting could have improved Japan’s economic 
performance during that decade.
However, in assessing Japanese monetary easing after the bursting of the bubble,
Guy M. Meredith maintained that, rather than phased expansion, monetary 
conditions should have been eased more quickly and more aggressively. Lars E. O.
Svensson pointed out that the BOJ’s inflation forecasts should be disclosed to 
facilitate evaluation of the adequacy of policy responses. Vítor Gaspar commented
that the experiences of Japan illustrated the extreme difficulties involved in measuring
the real equilibrium interest rate and potential GDP growth in real time. 
William R. White found that the insufficient monetary expansion in the 1990s
resulted in an increase in the real exchange rate, which, in turn, became a source of
persistent deflationary pressure. Allan H. Meltzer stressed that it was a mistake of 
the Japanese policy makers to manipulate the nominal exchange rate with the aim 
of curtailing current account imbalances, which stemmed from the structural 
imbalance between domestic savings and investment. He voiced worries that this
mistake was seen not only in the 1985–87 period, but also during the East Asian 
crisis of 1997–98.
Yutaka Yamaguchi responded that although the BOJ does not directly target 
foreign exchange rates, it takes measures to offset the impact of foreign exchange rate fluctuations when they cause significant effects on domestic economic activities.
In this sense, the BOJ has certainly not ignored exchange rate fluctuations. Keimei
Kaizuka noted that the MOF wanted to keep the yen-U.S. dollar rate high through
the late 1980s to the early 1990s in order to alleviate trade frictions between the
United States and Japan, and suggested that the BOJ’s monetary policy may have
been constrained by this. 
With regard to prudential policy, Thomas F. Cargill pointed out that an im-
portant factor that complicated the handling of the nonperforming-asset problem
was the belief among the general public that the government would rescue everyone
even if problems materialized. As to the role of central banks in handling structural
policy, Collyns and Cargill emphasized that there were limits to what the central
bank could accomplish and stressed that they should concentrate exclusively on
macroeconomic problems.
Commenting on Meltzer’s keynote speech, which focused attention on low 
investment as the main reason for slower growth in the 1990s, Yamaguchi pointed
out that, assuming that the high levels of investment seen in Japan in the late 1980s
were not sustainable, the stock adjustments experienced in the 1990s were, from a
medium- or long-term perspective, an inevitable consequence. On Meltzer’s notion
that managers of troubled banks tend to incline toward excessive risk-taking, he
maintained that in the 1990s Japanese bank managers have been generally extremely
cautious in their risk-taking. Meltzer agreed that low investment had its origins in 
the excessive investment of the 1980s, but indicated that the persistent contrast of
imbalance between domestic saving and investment in Japan and the United States
formed a background against which a yen-appreciation policy was chosen, intention-
ally or by chance. He argued that a depreciation of the yen would create additional
demand for exports from Japan, which would in turn expand its imports from Asian
countries and also serve for an orderly solution of the U.S. current-account deficit in
the somewhat longer run.
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